The ambiguous behavior of Macron

Within Europe there is not only the problem of those who do not share the problems with the other member states, but there are also those who behave in a uncommon manner when there are economic interests that can be used politically, To rebalance a dissatisfaction present within your country. Macron's election as President of the French Republic was welcomed with relief for the escape of danger that the Eliseo could sit on Marine Le Pen and also with some satisfaction for what might seem like an enthusiastic continuation of accession to the idea of ​​a Europe as a common ground. In fact, the warnings coming from different political and social parts of France, even not by the right, were far from enthusiastic; The new French president spoke of being a kind of neo-liberal, ready to sacrifice social gains in favor of the laws of the economy; However, a leader and a nationalist nationalist was not expected, especially since French companies had operated abroad with the utmost freedom and without the hassles of local governments. The case of the nationalization of French shipyards by a state-owned Italian industry has raised the still further question about the real policies that Brussels is bringing forward and should ensure. The French scenario, however, is currently affected by a large decline in popularity by the French president, partly due to physiological reasons and in part, the most substantial, due to the policies being implemented, which do not seem to solve the problems of the French. In politics, the classic answer to an internal difficulty is to take action on an international level, able to divert attention from the internal plane. Macron has devised his plan to try to hit a country, albeit ally, which should not be small, otherwise the scope of its intervention would be reduced, but it has a manifest political weakness, both for economic difficulties and the poor authority of His executive. This country is very close, even at the border of France and it is Italy. Against Rome, Macron's action is divided into two distinct plans: the first is of international contrast to the Libyan question and the second is aimed at denying the legitimate purchase of French shipyards, the majority of which was first in the South Korean hand. Both of Macron's actions reveal a great deal of misguidance, for taking action in ways that can not be framed in a dialogue between allies. The French president with the attitude on Libya seems to reckon with the action of his predecessor, Sarkozy, guilty of having acted disgustingly and irresponsibly. For now, Macron has been more cautious, but it is impossible not to mention the French interests on Libyan oil and, at the same time, the closure of Italy against refugee management. Of course, Rome would need a more authoritative government and capable of taking major international responsibilities, both as ministerial figures and as supporters of the political world; On the contrary, the presence of a futures government with highly variable support allows France and Macron to show its worst face: that of the Grandeur, which is reflected in the most retroactive golling, characterized by the absolute lack of respect for the allies. With a strong government, Italy would be able to provide adequate economic response, relying on the strategic centrality of some French companies, to bring them under Italian control, including the state, and at the same time to operate internationally Effective to undermine Paris initiatives. The central issue, however, is another: what is Macron's reliability in relation to growth, especially Europe's policy? Are we perhaps using Brussels to increase our power and that of Paris, with the aim of gaining greater importance for the French country, probably in a two-race competition with Germany? If that were the case, and, in truth, it seems very much, the hopes placed on Macron in relation to the development of Europe seem to be vain. This could be a new factor of destabilization within an increasingly experienced union as a means of enhancing the advantages of individual countries, rather than as the ultimate goal of an effective supranational organization.