North Korea available for nuclear disarmament

According to the government of Seoul, North Korea would be ready to start a process of denuclearization of the military sector of the country, without asking for the abandonment of American troops from the territory of South Cora. ​​Seoul, at this stage, is interpreting very careful the role of mediator between Washington and Pyongyang, having as main objective to defuse the danger of a conflict between the US and North Korea, which would see the southern part of the country as the main victim. If what was affirmed by Seoul was true, it would be the first time that North Korea did not place the departure of US troops in the counterparts for its nuclear disarmament. The US military stationed in South Korea is about 28,000 and has so far constituted the main obstacle to North Korean nuclear disarmament, precisely because the atomic weapon was used as a possible possibility of an eventual invasion. On the other hand, the American withdrawal would be an insurmountable obstacle in a negotiation on the disarming of Pyongyang. The North Korean novelty is explained by analysts through the request of the regime, which will require security guarantees for its survival; if this hypothesis is true, one can not think only of a form of pressure from China, but also the continuous informal meetings between the American and North Korean representatives. Kim Jong-Un would have prioritized the security of remaining in charge of the nation, a permanence threatened several times by the United States. However, to believe that this is the only reason does not seem real, one possibility could consist in the fear of triggering an escalation towards a more widespread atomic weapon endowment. Japan's threats to equip themselves with a nuclear weapon are very concrete, given that Tokyo already has all the knowledge necessary to build the atomic weapon in a short time. Japan's position is very critical of the possible concessions to North Korea and the American openings in Pyongyang; what is feared in Tokyo is that the collaborative behavior of North Korea is not sincere, but can hide a tactic aimed at protecting part of its military arsenal. The Japanese attitude is much feared by China, because it constitutes an alteration to the regional equilibrium and because there are always potentially dangerous disputes between the two countries. For Beijing, finding an opponent with an atomic weapon is very different from having one with only conventional armaments. The issue does not seem secondary in North Korean developments: the Chinese objective is to maintain a situation in the region under control, to preserve stability and commercial trafficking: in this perspective, Kim Jong-un's request falls completely, as China would have previously operated to surrender the scheme. If the North Korean dictator agrees with the US, it must first have agreed with Beijing that could have guaranteed greater international availability. On the other hand, an equally important motivation for China is to avoid the meeting of the two Koreas, which would cause the American presence on its borders. All this can only be achieved with a détente between Washington and Pyongyang, which also satisfies Seoul. On the American side for Trump this would be a diplomatic victory, which not even Obama could boast: the nuclear disarmament of North Korea would represent a prominent point in the career of the President of the United States, which would bring his prestige back home on the international stage .