The difficulties between Brussels and London for Europe output

With the delivery of the letter that starts the English exit procedure by the European Union, you enter into the practical aspects that will have to be a matter of agreement between the two sides. These agreements primarily political, but then they will have real effects on individual subjects reason to bargaining. One of the points where, for now the parties are more distant, is that of arrangements to adjust the output from the union and the future relations between the two sides: the UK would prefer to deal with the two aspects simultaneously, while Europe first question to define the output and then adjust future relations. It is understandable that the Prime Minister trying to implement a strategy that can minimize end-cons, trying to agree with the output conditions and future relationships, linking them inextricably together. This attempt, however, is opposed by Brussels, which wants to leave the least possible space for negotiation in London; In this regard it should be noted that, on the European side, the parliament will vote on a resolution at the end of the negotiation, and, among its powers will have the right to veto. This means that the European elective assembly will reject the hypothetical agreement. So to avoid a negative vote by the parliament, which would lengthen the time, negotiators will have grim a satisfactory agreement for both parties. The main intention, from Brussels, is to keep with the UK understandings regarding the defense and the fight against terrorism, although this seems complicated already for lack of cooperation between the secret services of countries within the ' Union. On the rest of the subjects the hope is to reach an understanding agreed, especially to prevent the United Kingdom become a state whose legal regime governing trade relations is the rules of the WTO, in this case from both sides could be applied customs duties on incoming goods. If this happens, despite the disadvantage it would be for both parties to be most adversely affected would be the United Kingdom. Certainly a stiffening of the two parts could also cause non-cooperation in defense matters. One aspect that London holds much has the functionality of its institutions and financial organizations, that without access to the European market, would see their greatly reduced operation. One possibility to operate in Europe is similar to the Swiss company, organizing their union activities, thanks to a permit obtained from the European Commission, but without an agreement that satisfies Brussels, this possibility is virtually ruled out. A very difficult question to be resolved are the contributions to the European budget that London has pledged to match up to 2020, ie after the exit from Europe, which should take place in 2019; These contributions are estimated at about € 60 billion, a substantial amount that London will try not to pay, or to a lesser pay, encountering the natural opposition of the union, which has already budgeted English contributions. Another aspect on which Brussels does not compromise the will of London to forge separate agreements with the states of the union members, thus avoiding the Community decisions; Brussels will try to put this ban in the agreements, but if it does not succeed it could always provide for penalties for both the member states, and for the United Kingdom, through the tightening of duties. Finally, there remains the Scottish question, if the Edinburgh parliament should decide for the referendum and detachment from London were to get the win, Brussels admission of Scotland should follow the procedure valid for any other state, but the perception is it could open a preferential way, as a region of a country formerly belonging to the union, and thus formally already in Europe, even if it will not create friction with London. Perhaps the best thing, even for Scotland would be to wait until the end of the negotiations to open the front of the referendum, to be lighter on a deal that promises already difficult.