The meaning of the German elections

Turkey could issue sanctions against Iraqi Kurdistan, which starts a referendum consultation to leave Iraq and create the first independent Kurdish state. Erdogan would be one of the worst fears, and his country's political protection program would also be greatly reduced. In fact, the Turkish president has set the first objective for internal and regional policy to prevent the creation of a Kurdish state entity; this applies both within the borders of the country, where the Kurdish Autonomous instances have long been suppressed and the regime has interrupted any kind of dialogue beyond the national boundaries. The conduct of Turkey in Syria is a clear example: first with the occult support to the caliphate, then with the struggle to the same; in both cases Turkish military maneuvers had as unannounced targets Kurdish sites and Kurdish fighters. The Syrian Kurds were particularly affected. The situation in Iraqi Kurdistan is, however, very different: since the fall of Saddam Hussein, the region has enjoyed great administrative autonomy by the central Iraqi government, thanks to the support that Kurdish fighters have assured the US Army to penetrate into Iraq dominated by Saddam Hussein. Political and administrative autonomy is also economical for the oil fields directly managed by the Kurds. On an international level Iraqi Kurdistan is historically very close to the United States, both for the aforementioned aid against Saddam Hussein and for the military support that the Kurdish troops have ensured in the struggle against the Islamic State and for which they have been decisive, completing the deficiencies of the Iraqi army. The proclamation of the referendum was officially opposed by Washington, which does not want to go against the Turkish ally and who prefers a united Iraq, fearing that the differences between the Sunni and Shi'ite are not yet flat, but it seems impossible, given the close relationship between the two sides, there is no unofficial support to the desire for autonomy of the Iraqi Kurds, was nothing but the help provided. For Erdogan, however, a Kurdish state at the Turkish border can be the prerequisite for the greater aspiration of Kurds from Turkey and Syria. For the Turkish president, this factor constitutes a potential element of instability within its own country, and the threat of sanctions, which is no longer well defined, is the first response to a referendum whose outcome is taken for granted. Through the common border, commercial traffic is intense and the Iraqi Kurdistan will be the most damaged, because it would block crude oil from Turkish refineries, but also for Turkish companies themselves, which are trading with exports the Kurds, the damage would be high. According to some analysts, the Kurdish entity's separation from Iraq could harm the war against the Islamic state, but this feeling does not seem to be very likely for the results achieved by the coalition against the caliphate on the ground. What is most worrying is the possible escalation, which could lead to Erdogan, beyond the level of sanctions. A willingness to use Turkish military troops beyond national borders could not be ruled out, opening a new front in the Middle East. Such a scenario could take advantage of Iran, whose Shiite militias fought alongside the Kurdish fighters against the Islamic state, to find a way to weaken the Sunni coalition that is challenging Tehran. In any case, a military evolution of Iraq-Turkey and Kurdistan confrontation could open up a wide range of scenarios that could alter regional balances with a possible resumption of Islamic terrorism. A sort of all against all, which must be carefully avoided by world diplomacy.