Russia and China allied obliged

Western sanctions forced Russia to move closer to China. Moscow is the capital of an immense state with a great availability of raw materials, especially in the energy sector, but which continues to have large deficits from the point of view of industrial development. The Russian country pays for its politicians' limited ability to develop industrialization plans capable of becoming an economic alternative to the preponderance of the primary sector. Putin's geopolitical ambitions of Russia have created a difficult international situation for the national economy because of the sanctions that the West has imposed on Moscow for its behavior, especially for the Ukrainian affair and the plans and expectations of the Kremlin against of the US presidency of Trump, which provided for a rapprochement between the US and Russia, were frustrated by the distrust of the American administrative classes. The intrusiveness of the Russian international political action, carried out by means not even legitimate, is the signal of an unscrupulous activity that is carried out with obvious errors of calculation and evaluation in relation to the results obtained. In spite of international ambitions and an impossible-to-recognize activism, which has cleverly exploited the spaces left by Washington, the economic variable represents a value from which not even the new Russian imperialism can prescind. The only alternative to raise the balance of troubled budgets was to address the world's number two power, China, which always needs to expand its commercial action and which, to do so, must feed its energy needs. The two countries, although often in agreement with the UN Security Council, are not allies and are not complementary, as their respective ambitions are often at odds, but must maintain a good diplomatic relationship based on their respective aversion to the Member States. US. If Washington is increasingly at odds with Beijing for reasons of commercial policy, Moscow seeks to exploit these disagreements through increasingly frequent contacts with the People's Republic of China, but it is not an organic alliance based on common interests and the long term; rather we are faced with a series of single episodes based on mutual convenience. At the center of these exchanges are the energy raw materials, but also the Chinese will to penetrate, with its goods, a market that still has good potential like the Russian one. If these are the prerequisites, it is even more interesting to analyze the possible consequences of this relationship; one of the most probable scenarios is that the situation is maintained within these boundaries as long as the US continues in their isolationism, in fact it does not seem possible to break this situation by one of the two international actors involved. The scenario could be different if one of the two countries wanted to overcome the other for any potential reason: this hypothesis seems to be more difficult for Russia, which can not alienate the Chinese friendship and with it the economic advantages that bind it to Beijing. On the other hand, China seems to continue to move on non-interference and that its international policy is based on utmost caution; however, if there is a country that can undermine international leadership in the United States, this is certainly not Russia, which can only play leading roles on limited scenarios, as has happened for Syria. On the contrary, the Chinese ambitions will sooner or later have to materialize in some episodes of international significance and then Russia will only have to choose between a boundary neutrality or play a subordinate role, probably alongside China. The real risk for Moscow is to end up in a clear way as a secondary power, against all the demands of the Kremlin. But for the Russian country the role of superpower is no longer practicable in the US-China bipolar context and its economic situation is only the first clear sign of it.