The Egyptian president will be able to hold power until 2030

The permanence in power of Al Sisi, in Egypt, is destined to last until 2030; a proposal made by deputies particularly loyal to the current Egyptian president, foresees an extension of the mandate from four to six years and the possibility of applying to a third mandate, an eventuality expressly not envisaged by the current constitution. The approval of the proposal by the People's Assembly is sure, the members of the opposition forces are just fifteen, subsequently the constitutional reform will have to be approved also through a popular referendum, whose outcome should not represent concern for Al Sisi and the its political strength. Initially the period of potential permanence in the office of president should have been up to 2034, but the Legal Commission limited this possibility until 2030, making a fake legality exercise, which allows the president's party to present this reform as legitimate (which can however be changed later). The reform also contains the possibility for the president to have greater powers over the appointment of magistrates, going to undermine, as well as practically, even formally the independence of the Egyptian judges and the introduction of a second representative chamber, the Senate, and the creation of quotas in the popular representatives in favor of the women and the Copts, Egyptian Cristrian religious minority. They are concessions to democracy that seem to be only formal and that are functional to divert attention from the concentration of power in the hands of the Egyptian dictator. The political situation of the country is in line with that of a nation where the armed forces have seized power with a coup, initially directed against the religious dictatorship imposed by the Muslim Brotherhood, which has then invested all forms of dissent, even who was against Islamism in power and wanted a secular democracy. According to some estimates, there are about 40,000 political prisoners in Egypt, while repression is constantly evolving and also controls dissent via the web. According to the supporters of the president, the reform is necessary to allow Al Sisi to complete his cycle of reforms and tries to include in the institutions the popular classes trying to broaden the consensus, a signal that 98% of the votes with which he was elected to Sisi last year is not considered reliable even by the dictator's own apparatus. As has been repeatedly emphasized, Egypt is the main example of the failure of the process towards the democracies of the popular revolts: the country, in fact, passed from Mubarak to the Muslim Brothers and then returned to a dictatorship of the type of the miit. Meanwhile, international attitudes and sensitivity have varied greatly: Trump appreciates Al Sisi, so much to call him a great president and countries like Israel and the Sunni monarchies consider him a strategic ally in the region. More generally, Al Sisi falls into the category of strong men who are enjoying worldwide success, like Trump himself, Putin or the Chinese president. The difference of the American president is that the US system does not allow institutional drifts like in other countries, but his permanence in power is a clear indication of the current democratic sensitivity that is present in the USA. Moreover, even in European countries the cult of personality represents a dangerous drift for some time and in any case a character like Al Sisi in command in a crucial nation such as Egypt offers far greater guarantees that an unstable and unsupported democratic system cannot guarantee; certainly, then, because Al Sisi continues to be an ally of the West must be adequately funded.