US President-elect Biden will have to shelter his predecessor's trade policy, which has also had an impact on American foreign policy. In the era of globalization, dividing trade from foreign policy is anachronistic, because the two factors increasingly go hand in hand. Especially in a world scenario where contrasts are increasingly resolved without resorting to wars, which are left as a last option or in secondary scenarios, commercial competition, as an instrument of economic and therefore political affirmation, becomes the strategic theater to determine supremacy and advantages. Trump never understood this focal point, which is characterizing foreign policy achievements globally; closed in his isolationist strategy, the expiring American president conducted a short-sighted policy made up of tariffs on imports, not selective from a political point of view: to benefit American products, he conducted an indiscriminate struggle against adversaries and allies, which produced damage politicians both in the adverse field, and above all in the friendly one. The success that Trump attributes to himself in the economic field is actually a lie, given that he took advantage of the measures bequeathed by Obama and that his advisors have managed to keep active. For Biden it will be different, especially in relation to the trade wars that Trump will leave to the new president and which, in some way, will have to be defused. It has been said since the beginning of the electoral campaign that neither of the two contenders could have changed the attitude towards China, this is true because there is a continuous need to condemn what is a dictatorship, as, moreover, Beijing has repeatedly proved and that a White House tenant from the Democratic Party will have to stress even more strongly; however, a different and more diplomatic approach can be hoped for in the next dialogue between the US and China, which is able to mitigate the level of the clash. But the real crux is the attitude that Biden will want to have with Europe and the need to recover a relationship that his predecessor has considerably deteriorated. Trump's behavior, combined with the situation generated by the pandemic, underlined how for Brussels the need to be increasingly autonomous has become a real emergency. This factor will continue to be present also in relations with the new American administration, even if, as is to be hoped, relations will improve. On the other hand, Europe can only give priority to relations with the United States, over that with China, whose dictatorial ways internally and the failure to respect correct commercial practices with foreign countries, condition the evaluations of the states. of the Union. In addition to convergence on China, the US and Europe must start from the awareness that together they constitute the richest market in the world and this is a primary factor that can act as a driving force for both parties. It should also be considered that China, which is seeing this market foreclosed on, is trying to create alternatives, such as the recently signed one to which several countries, including the western area, such as Japan and Australia, as well as various Asian states, adhere. created a larger market than the single European area, but also the trade union between the USA, Canada and Mexico, adding up to 40% of global trade; this association has no political constraints and this represents a factor of weakness, but aims to obtain a reduction in customs duties of about 90% in twenty years, also integrating the services and goods of the members. This agreement, which highlights the Chinese leadership, was made possible precisely by the abandonment of the role of American influence on the Asian continent. Repeating this mistake with Europe, but also with Canada and Mexico, often equally mistreated by Trump, could be lethal for the US economy. From the global economic aspect to the political one, the step is short: if Washington were to further weaken its international political weight, its decline would be guaranteed and any willingness to regain positions would imply a very high financial and social cost. Better to develop an alternative and competitive strategy to China, through the involvement of direct allies, with tools that provide common benefits, even beyond the economic aspects, and the attraction in this orbit of Beijing's enemies such as India; also trying to take away from China, from a commercial point of view, countries of western orbit, such as South Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, which have come too dangerously close to Beijing.
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