The European Union fears an annexation of Belarus to Moscow

 The crisis following the hijacking of the plane bound for Lithuania by the Belarusian regime led to a reaction, which made it possible to verify an unprecedented identity of views among European countries. The harshness of the response from Brussels, in fact, was shared both by those countries, such as the Baltic ones, which have always feared the actions of Moscow, and by nations more inclined to resume dialogue with Russia. This premise, despite the sanctions being directed against Minsk, is a duty to analyze the possible consequences of this diplomatic step, including for the Kremlin. One of the European fears, aggravated precisely by the issue of the Irish plane forced to land in Minsk, is the possibility that Russia will create a sort of federation with Belarus, which, in reality, could mean the annexation of Minsk to Moscow. After all, Russia is also planning similar solutions for areas belonging to Ukraine: the aim is to contain a possible advance of Western influence on the borders of the former Soviet country, which could be implemented with the economic action of the European Union and of the military one of the Atlantic Alliance, which already deployed its forces in various countries belonging to the Warsaw Pact. The most immediate consequences would be a further closure of Russia to Europe and an even greater worsening of relations with the West. This is a possibility that several European countries are against and which is seen as too negative a development, such as to constitute a difficult front to face, in these terms, even for Washington, which is already focused on other issues. Moscow's intentions would be to proceed along this line, if elements such as to distract it from its intentions were not to intervene and even Belarus, by now isolated and with only Russia as an ally, would see no alternative solutions to the substantial renunciation of its sovereignty. For Moscow, with no other way out, pursuing this goal is functional to maintaining its geopolitical influence and, on the domestic front, a distraction for public opinion in a phase of rather serious economic stagnation, where per capita income is at a standstill. about 9,000 euros per year due to the absence of an industrial policy capable of diversifying national production to make it more independent from the energy sector and the inability to modernize an industrial fabric characterized by excessively obsolete plants. Europe, however, has no interest in Russia remaining in such a position: a more modern country, both from the point of view of rights and the ability to spend more, could represent a potentially huge and very close market from the point of view. geographical. The first step is to create a tendency of greater detente through greater cooperation by diversifying the possible aid to Moscow and Minsk, with the first aim of maintaining the sovereignty of Belarus on its territory. The perplexities concern the relationship with the two heads of state, who are severely contested at home; if this prerogative could favor European plans, in reality the repressive apparatus ensures a practically certain stay in power and this could backfire against European projects, which would end up financing authoritarian regimes that are not at all willing to move towards forms of greater democracy. However, it must be said that the capacity of European countries to respond to the Belarusian provocation, univocal and unusually fast, has produced a certain impression both in Minsk, but above all in Moscow, where the ability to produce sufficiently harsh responses has been recorded. Brussels. Russia is already subject to a regime of sanctions which has produced negative results for the Kremlin precisely in the economic field and which have contributed to the discontent of the population. The pact with the social body based on the assumption of more prosperity in the field of more authoritarianism has caused an erosion in the approval of Putin, who has found himself grappling with an increasingly open dispute. This fact created great concern in the Kremlin, so much so that it feared that the Belarusian protests could also influence the climate in Russia, through an exponential growth of dissent. For now, to counter the phenomenon, solutions have been thought of that are contrary to European approval, but if Putin wants to get out of the crisis he will have to create the conditions for collaboration with Europe, which must begin with the relaxation of sanctions and the ability to create the conditions for attracting foreign investments and, to do so, the change in the domestic political situation is the first necessary step, even if, perhaps, not yet sufficient.