Trump's second presidency has highlighted a defense posture that puts Europe on the back burner. The very survival of the Atlantic Alliance as it has been known until now is seriously in doubt. This has all come with tariff threats and designs on Greenland, completely outside the norms of relations between Washington and its allies. Only the START nuclear treaty remained to maintain some order on the issue of military nuclear power. Once this is over, a period of uncertainty begins, and Europe will need to equip itself with its own nuclear defense. The Cold War guaranteed the protection of all of Europe thanks to the United States, but now the conditions have changed: we are no longer in a bipolar context, and, above all, Trump does not appear willing to use American nuclear power to defend the old continent from a potential Russian attack. The first tangible effect for international politics is the end of Germany's historic opposition to a nuclear shield, albeit not a national one, but one that involves the entire European Union. Other European countries, such as Sweden and Poland, and certainly the Baltic states, are also open to the immediate possibility of using the French nuclear shield. The Ukrainian example is exemplary. At the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Kiev was the world's second-largest nuclear power, precisely because of its proximity to Europe. Having ceded all its nuclear weapons to Russia in exchange for a non-aggression treaty evidently violated by Moscow, it has lost its ability to deter attacks from the Kremlin. For Europe, the French and, perhaps, British solution represents only a temporary measure, which must be overcome in order to strengthen the continent's defenses. This requires massive investments and adequate political will, both central and peripheral, as well as a different social attitude among the people. Accustoming people not to traditional rearmament but to nuclear weapons will only generate strong tensions. Equipping oneself with nuclear weapons is not an instantaneous achievement; it requires years and technical expertise that may not be available within the Union. In the immediate future, therefore, it is impossible to be completely independent of the United States, which must be convinced to continue European defense. However, it is essential to begin organizing now to equip ourselves with a nuclear deterrent. This will certainly contribute to creating a new balance of terror, but will not leave Europe defenseless from geopolitical threats, wherever they come from. Moreover, while the shield is currently provided by France, Paris does not intend to offer this protection free of charge. It requires investments not only from the French Republic, while maintaining the exclusive authority to launch a nuclear attack. However, beyond these limitations, which may even appear legitimate, France's nuclear arsenal consists of only 290 nuclear warheads, which provide a limited shield compared to Russia's more than 4,300 and even the US's 3,700. Now, if we consider potentially hostile states, excluding the US, such as Russia, China, and North Korea, not to mention actors like Pakistan and India, which could have a vested interest in threatening Europe, the need for a common European Union arsenal becomes, unfortunately, urgent and cannot be postponed. The European Union currently has little or no defense against threats of all kinds, and no longer being able to count on American protection, it is highly vulnerable; new agreements must be established with Washington that protect Europe for the limited time necessary to become a fully-fledged nuclear power.
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