The variables of the Syrian scenario

The reason why the conflict in Syria risks becoming a sort of world war is the presence of armed forces from different countries on Syrian territory, with clearly different objectives; a scenario that presents a variability of situations in a strongly precarious equilibrium. Making an analysis of the forces in the field we must start from the main interpreter of the conflict: the dictator of Damascus Bashar Al Assad. After seven years of war, with half a million motions and half the population of the country displaced abroad, the Damascus government controls about two thirds of the territory and, nominally, it appears as the winner of the war; nevertheless, it is a victory achieved only thanks to the intervention of the Russian and Iranian allies, without which it would presumably have been defeated three years ago. Assad is a figure reduced to a head of state strongly controlled by the allies, kept in power only to favor the geopolitical interests of Moscow and Tehran. Russia initially had the main objective of maintaining control over the only naval base in the Mediterranean Sea, located right on the Syrian coast; Putin, however, was able to exploit the vacuum left by the US, first with Obama and later with Trump, making Moscow the role of super power that he had promised to an increasingly nationalist population. From a military point of view, Russia has legitimized its influence on the Syrian country with the employment of about 50,000 soldiers and, above all, with the installation of an anti-aircraft system based on Russian technology. For Iran, as well as the geopolitical aspect of the religious: the goal of Tehran is to create a territorial band, which, starting from Iran, through Iraq, Syria and arrive in Lebanon, to unite the Shiite population; it is a fundamental question for the Islamic republic, especially in the current phase, which sees an increasingly compact union among the Sunni states, led by the historic enemies of Iran: Saudi Arabia. Beyond these two countries there is Turkey, which is characterized by a behavior that is not always linear, depending on the convenience of the moment: if at the beginning, probably, Ankara has helped to finance the Sunni extremists, who would later become the troops of the Caliphate, with the developments of the conflict has approached Assad, framing it as a potential ally for the containment of Kurdish ambitions to create its own sovereign entity. Currently the Turkish army is guarding a strip of Syrian territory located on its own border and lately has again changed its attitude on Assad hoping for the fall, after the Syrian regular forces have lined up to protect the Kurds. The US, after making the assessment that the Islamic State had been defeated, had to return home the approximately 4,000 people present on Syrian soil, the bombing with chemical weapons is changing Washington's plans. This sudden and unexpected turnaround may have been dictated by reasons of domestic and international opportunities due to Israeli reminders for the presence of Iranians on the borders of their country. For Tel Aviv, in fact, the proximity of Tehran's troops is not acceptable, also because it also means a material support for Hezbollah. However, Tel Aviv maintains good relations with Moscow and this represents a variable that can not be readily understood in the Kremlin's relations with the Iranians. Finally, we need to consider other armed forces present on the scenario, which are not the expression of state entities, but militias of groups uprooted from their positions, as in the Syrian north and in the Aleppo area there are members of Al Qaeda, while in the desert between Syria and Iraq there are several groups belonging to the Islamic State, which could be the reservoir for new radical militias. A separate argument must be made for the Kurds, who without American support could approach the Russians, creating a new reason for embarrassment in the relationship between Moscow and Iran. This framework gives back to a very complicated situation, rich in variables, that with a military development, such as the possible American attack on Assad, risks to have strong repercussions on a global scale. The future scenarios seem difficult to predict, even if a direct confrontation between the US and Russia does not seem likely, the two powers would have the way to wage war on other plans, first of all the commercial and European stability. Not to mention that consolidated aspects such as the Iranian nuclear deal would surely be canceled. Now is the time for diplomacy to take action and set off a negative phase for the whole world.