Beijing is the real goal of Pyongyang

Despite the very tense situation, which would require a more cautious attitude by all parties involved, North Korea announced the resumption of the nuclear plant in Yongbyon, closed in 2007, in accordance with the agreements of 2006 which provided for the suspension nuclear activities in exchange for economic aid. The official reasons for this decision was based, were very explicit and will reside in Pyongyang to strengthen its nuclear arsenal and at the same time solve the energy shortage in the country. The strategy, which is outlined in the apparatus North Korea's increasingly clear is that enunciated by the country's leader Kim Jong-Un, who has expressly identified the central role of nuclear power in the country, as a fundamental element to ensure the inviolability of the sovereignty of Pyongyang in view of deterrence of a possible attack on the country. This view has been presented as an interpretation to facilitate the maintenance of regional peace and balance, albeit in a clearly unstable. The lure of the Cold War balance of terror is clear, but the comparison with the actors at the time, who governed the situation in a decisive manner is completely out of place with a state whose internal dynamics are completely unknown. The young leader, who represents the third generation of hereditary communist dictatorship, there is the safety of the role it plays effectively, as well as the protocol of officialdom, in the system of government of North Korea. The question should be why this nuclear escalation is right now and what it may imply. It is impossible not to remember that behind the hazy and unclear transfer of power, there were persistent rumors of infighting between the various apparatuses of the state and especially among the military, who are probably the real power holder of power in the country. One hypothesis is that the decisions of the government of Kim Jong-Un come, in fact, just by the military, which would be only the terminal official, but excluded from the actual decision-making process. The North Korean military caste, which is the summit of the apparatus which is for the major part of the state budget, it looks like a body anchored in visions outdated in the totality of the world, afraid of losing their power, still primary in the country, swept by industrialization pushes Beijing to establish in North Korea. What scares China, but is also seen as an opportunity, it is the dire economic situation of the country, faced with a scenario that touches food shortages and can generate dangerous mass migrations towards its borders, but from the point of Economically, the North Korean human mass can also be a cheap labor within their own country, for the industries of the Republic of China, already struggling with the rising cost of labor in the domestic market. This attempt of China, which is not an element of novelty, is also the willingness of Beijing to increase control over North Korea, which is believed by the Chinese government not reliable for their own needs for stability in a region crucial for the passage of goods . It should be noted that Pyongyang China is the only ally he can count, but that is acceptable only if it is limited to aid and does not try to diminish the isolation of North Korea. In fact, Beijing, the headquarters of the UN Security Council, has taken an unprecedented step for its line of conduct diplomatic, supporting sanctions against Pyongyang, after the recent nuclear test. The position of Beijing was so very clear and have created a lot of confusion in Pyongyang. But North Korea can not go directly against China, both for reasons of political expediency, which objective conditions of military inferiority against a country with which, moreover, has several kilometers of common border. The strategy developed, therefore, was to turn the attention and threats against the U.S. and South Korea, with the clear intent to cause a change not just in the complex regional balance. The explicit threats of nuclear bombing in Japan have also further expanded the boundaries of the chaos created by Pyongyang, but the recipient, it is almost exclusively Beijing, beyond the ostentatious caution is called for very important decisions. China, in fact, can not long tolerate the status of which is subject to blackmail from North Korea, this opens up potential scenarios that Beijing must be prevented: the first is the possible reunification of the two Koreas, in case of implosion of Pyongyang, with an integration in favor of Seoul, which would lead to the Chinese border a direct economic competitor, a hypothesis still better than the current, but not quite convenient in Beijing. A second scenario is the status quo in constant danger of excesses North Korean probability that China does not seem at all like. Then there is the overthrow of the summit of power in favor of a more functional to Chinese interests. This assumption is not easily practicable, the total absence of an organic opposition in North Korea and would represent a significant deviation to the dictates of foreign policy that the Chinese are self-imposed, however, it is reasonable to assume that the United States and also, perhaps, South Korea would not have objected to a solution in this regard, which could ensure the stability of regional interest that all the actors involved, and, for this reason, is the only lever that Pyongyang may move to protect its interests.