War in Syria: the reasons and the possible effects of a U.S. attack limited

The weapons that the U.S. should use against the regime in Damascus, are essentially composed of Tomahawk missiles, which have a high accuracy against stationary targets and can cover up to 1,600 miles away, have already been used in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya and expected to be launched by naval units, both surface, and submarine, in the Mediterranean. But this missile units, although reliable, that does not guarantee a certain effectiveness against moving targets with a limited capacity for destruction and which would be reached at the end of their life cycle, because they fall due and if not used, they should be disposed of by the U.S. Navy. These details indicate that Washington does not seem willing to give the coup thanks to the regime, but to punish him for having contravened the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons. The reasons for this commitment, which from the outset appears to be limited, must be allocated to the assessments made by the White House about the situation that could come and create with the fall of Assad. The attitude that the United States has taken until now to war in Syria was a separation dictated, certainly by the Obama administration's reluctance to engage in military campaigns in new regions of the Arab world, but also by the profound uncertainty of the balance in the rich tapestry that is fighting Assad. The U.S. could use an executive of laity or address moderate Islamic movements, which could support actions from Washington in a region crucial for contiguity with Israel, conversely, the presence of radical Islamic movements, which have in their programs for the Syria the establishment of a caliphate based on sharia, puts the White House in strong apprehension and determines the continued uncertainty that has so far characterized the faltering political action against the Syrian War. If the establishment of democratic political forces is not possible, the U.S. would prefer, albeit reluctantly, to a new Islamic state, staying at the power of the same Assad, a vision that does not go beyond the view of the international balance of power, but that is compromised from the basic flaw of an internal situation which would, however, destined to reopen, with scenarios are difficult to predict. With these premises, which are objective and difficult to solve immediate, it is understandable that the central goal for Obama is, at present, to gain time, taking the minimum of the initiative. A military response limited to the use of gas, can serve to bring the regime in Damascus to sit at the negotiating table, opening to a diplomatic solution to the crisis, which would be the preferred solution from the United States. So the targets should be subject to military units of the Syrian army, which is supposed to have made use of chemical weapons, the artillery missiles which would be mounted on the tested chemicals, deposits of helicopters manufactured by Russian, but not where they kept the arsenals of chemical weapons, to prevent these from falling into the hands of armed groups that are part of movements of Islamic extremists. A further possibility would be to hit the Syrian aviation centers, to weaken substantially regime forces, which have so far prevailed thanks to the possession of an air force on the armed rebels, who do not have one. It does not seem feasible however, at least with the means for the time being fielded by the U.S., a destruction of ground forces, armored troops, and in general of the Syrian military infrastructure, which would require sustained bombing and missile units different. It must be said, however, that if the U.S. action will not get, at least, the result of embarking on a diplomatic channel and bring forth a reaction, even with conventional weapons from Assad, in which you can pay the price for its civilian population, the move Washington will become a failure in front of the entire international audience, with obvious repercussions on the international prestige of Washington.