Afghanistan is close to Pakistan

The foreign policy of Afghanistan undergoes an abrupt change with the election of a successor to Ashraf Ghani Hamid Karzai; the latter had set up an alliance with India, the natural enemy of Pakistan, but the new president, recently installed in Kabul, seems to point towards Islamabad. The reasons are more than understandable: India, while representing a potential ally with higher investment capacity, is too far away and, more importantly, does not have the ability to negotiate with the Islamic militias opposing the Afghan government that Pakistan has. Islamabad upbeat India a country with which it shares the border, is a victory and at the same time, a guarantee of greater security. On this basis, the relationship between the two countries seems to have taken on a new momentum, as evidenced by the outcome of the visit to the Pakistani capital by the highest authorities of Afghanistan. Ghani stated that it is vital for the two countries to overcome their differences, going on to say that their relationship should have a development similar to that made in Paris and Berlin. While not neglecting the effects of economic cooperation, jointly creating the conditions to attract investors, for Afghanistan is important to Pakistan as an ally able to work diplomatically with the Islamic militants, who use the valleys of the border to hide and to hit them. The difficulty to enter into negotiations with the Taliban is objective and tactics pursued by Karzai, who have proven to be unsuccessful, amply demonstrate: Kabul alone can not undertake a process of pacification and even bet on an exclusively repressive attitude, because even the most powerful army in the world was able to defeat all the Islamic militias. Pakistan is the ideal ally for his contacts with extremist groups and the interest in establishing a lasting peace along its border. Seen in this perspective, the tactic Ghani is certainly reasonable, however, if the strength of the alliance with Islamabad own contacts with the environment of Islamic extremism, this factor is that much of the risk. It should be noted that the effective sovereignty of the government of Pakistan does not extend to all of its territory and that large parts are controlled by the Islamist militias, also the role of Pakistani intelligence is often contradictory to excessive promiscuity with elements outside of the law and members of the fundamentalist Muslim movements, by the Taliban to Al Qaeda, a factor that has often resulted in accusations of the US, to make Pakistan an ally become unreliable, then the presence, very tolerated, on the ground floor of the Pakistani members 'Muslim fundamentalism sought by the United States, of which Bin Laden is only the most striking example. Ghani can not fail to be aware of these factors, however, would rather give up the relationship with India which could be favored in its anti-Pakistan, to reassure the armed forces of Islamabad, in the hope that they can extend their control over areas controlled by the Taliban and at the same time, get them to a peace deal for too long pursued. It must be recognized in the new Afghan president who needs to move fast, because the December 31, when the bulk of the US contingent will leave the country, approaches: after Afghanistan will remain a workforce of 10,000 and 15,000 men with the function of training and train the local army and air cover different areas will fail encouraging potential actions by the Taliban. With this scenario, the strategy Ghani is understandable and perhaps even obliged, even though it contains more of a risk. On the other hand, even without taking into account the concerns regarding Pakistan to be checked if the Taliban want to sit at the negotiating table, even if these, then they will be successful. The representatives of the Taliban, in fact, continue to refuse to negotiate until the country of Afghanistan will no longer have foreign troops on its territory. It is precisely this difficulty that Pakistan will have to overcome as an intermediary in the diplomatic relationship between the state and the Afghan Taliban.