Putin near the European right

The need for economic policy can create unexpected affinity for subjects that may appear distant, but in fact they are closer than you think. In the international field this assumption is on the agenda with the alliance, ever closer, between the National Front, the French far-right party, and Vladimir Putin, leader of Russia who suffers diplomatic isolation and economic effects of sanctions. The two parties have a common enemy: the European Union, albeit for different reasons and drag within their bond other movements opposed to European integration, such as the Northern League, Italian opposition party, often racist, which at this stage is trying to create a wider audience within the country Italian. Marine Le Pen, the leader of the National Front, has shown on more than one occasion to understand the reasons of Moscow for its instances pan-prejudice, seeking to bring Ukraine under Russian influence. Putin, worried of the isolation in which he is confined to Russia, does not care too much for the allies it can find, contradicting himself; in fact a criticism of the Ukrainian leaders, who try to escape the influence of Moscow, was precisely that of fascism. But that has not stopped to finance, with appropriations important, just one of the parties further to the right of Europe. The decision of the Kremlin leader is due, as mentioned by contingent needs, but also a form of investment on what, according to the polls is the first party of France, of which its leader has a good chance to occupy the chair President of the Republic. From the ideological point of view, then, the affinity and closeness between the two parties is far away: united by nationalism more extreme the two movements share many ideas and Putin must also take into account the most dynamic movements that support him in Russia , who view with favor the relationship with their French counterparts. The ties to Putin with the European right are not, however, a novelty: the relationship with Berlusconi, although on more moderate positions, are still in progress, although the Italian industrialist no longer held public office and in Italy Russia is leaning more actively from the Northern League party, which has populist tendencies and also ranks at the right of Italian politics. However, the relationship is very different compared to the one between the National Front and the Kremlin: the Northern League, while recognizing the legitimacy of the reasons Russian, has set its relationship with Moscow over economic sanctions against the defense of Italian products, which enjoy a large market in Russia; but this attitude, which has been reflected in visits of party leader in the Russian capital, has offered a further element to break the international isolation. The fact remains that, even if it is not official talks, the political weight of the National Front can not be overlooked. This scenario shows how the strategy of Putin, trying to undermine the EU from within, seeking the support of a party emerging avowedly anti European, despite its declared policy belonging to the extreme right. This contiguity has to be a clear warning to European policy because it is the inclusion of external forces that seek to undermine the process of national unification. This is also not a secondary effect of continuing economic policy that gives Germany a role too dominant within the European Union. In Berlin should reflect on the reasons for these events in favor of Putin, which can only come from an economic policy too focused on mere numerical values and not on the welfare of people. The growth of anti-European movements also leads to unwanted effects in foreign policy, which are contrary to the interests of its mainly Germans. If it is acceptable to support Kiev, also in defense of the principles of international law, it is not enough, for this purpose, adapt to the sanctions of the Atlantic Alliance and isolate Moscow, we also need a different economic policy in favor of the citizens, who are also voters and, in protest against the EU, and indirectly against Germany, they can give their preference to those who seem to accommodate their concerns, although on political positions that do not share the same voters. The effects of stiffness observance of budgetary data are beginning to go beyond the effects on the economy and may soon affect foreign policy, in a manner which will be very difficult to go back.