The danger and the effects of a referendum on the euro greek

The dispute between Greece and the rest of Europe, is likely to have consequences far more decisive, the financial benefits or budgetary constraints. We are facing a clash between two different visions, dictated by diametrically opposed. For the new government in Athens is not only to respect the electoral promises, but to go a different conception of the decisions that the EU takes on the basis of financial calculations. The electoral program, which brought the left to the government, is not only the result of an ideological elaboration, but is derived from the real crisis, economic and social prevailing in the country. For new Greek leaders the first objective is to improve the condition of difficulty in which you find most of the people and then build the foundations so that this does not recur. Although seen, even from opposing political positions, is what happens in other European countries, where the political programs, especially the opposition, focus on how to how to limit the intrusiveness of Brussels. This does not happen only in the opposition movements, but also in some government parties, who seek, without having the strength to deflect Berlin from his intentions of rigor. Opposite of Greece, there is just as Germany, who leads a number of members of the euro, which have an attitude not unique but more nuanced application of rigid control of public accounts. However, for now, Berlin has always had the upper hand and forced the other countries to align its decisions. Germany leaves vent against, in words, lets make proclamations but, in the end, the address is always decided by its Ministry of Finance. The fundamental mistake is to precede the setting German economic data to the political assessments carried out with an overall view, in favor of a more pro-European as possible. In reality, the political calculations are made in Berlin, but only in the interest German. But this reflects some degree of nearsightedness or, at least, a narrow, short-term, which does not allow an organic development of the whole of Europe. What appears is that Germany is exaggerating and is practicing a strategy, which could then turn against it. The German success is due in large part to the euro, the stability of course, but also to its spread in the countries of the old continent, representing, in spite of the crisis, its prime market and its sales area better. Without the euro and maybe again with a very strong national currency, German exports would suffer a contraction can resize the German economy. The fight in the single currency is one of the main points of all those movements, that a little all over Europe are gaining more and more support to which Berlin has shown so far due attention. But between these movements there is the Greek left, which has always claimed to want to remain in the single European currency; this statement has reassured Berlin to be able to continue in the same way its policy towards Athens. Is true that Greece needs to stay in the euro, but it is also true that this stay is not at any cost. The threat of the greek government to hold a referendum on the preservation of the single currency, if the parties fail to approach the issue of aid, in exchange for reforms currently not feasible, is likely to open a series of similar requests, able to end the only unifying factor of the European countries. It is evident that in Greece the extreme a referendum would abolish joining the euro and reintroduce the national currency. Whether this could spread to Greece, here do not care; what matters is that this would constitute a dangerous precedent, extendable in all other countries, particularly in places where the presence of anti-European movements is increasingly important. Subjected to the euro referendum could resist in Italy, France, Spain, Belgium and other countries? This question should become crucial to the attitude that Berlin and financial institutions intend to keep, now with Greece and then with the other countries applying for less rigidity and greater flexibility especially in relation to specific national situations, without which these are managed from afar and with rules set out by the democratic path of the single country. What is needed, that is, is a radical change of attitude and behavior, which is not anchored to old logic of supremacy, also to preserve national wealth accumulated with wrongdoing.