Costs and benefits induced the resolution of the case greek

The situation of the scenario that presents itself on the Greek question, must take into account, for the search for a solution, some factors that represent conditions, both economic and political, which may not be disregarded if it is to reach a successful conclusion, excluding, that is, the output Athens from the single currency. In the urgency of reaching an agreement there is a reciprocity between the demands of creditors and those of the government greek, from which he can not ignore. On the one hand the Greek Government must have credible proposals to creditors, but they, in turn, should also set conditions for the sustainability of debt, a situation in which no one loses, the practical side of it in the one of the facade. Tsipras is, in a sense, hostage to the left side of the majority, that will never accept new aid contingent on further austerity. If this were to materialize it would be frustrated expectations of improvement of the people greek, which has sent a clear message to the European institutions. However, Athens will have to give something in return if he wants to see still fed their banking system, already collapsing. The solution of higher taxes for higher incomes for industrious and larger, coupled with the reform of the pension system, which should clear the pensions obtained with a few years of work, should be the cornerstone that Tsipras intends to Brussels. It will be necessary to determine whether that will be sufficient for creditors, who must also consider the costs and benefits arising from what you will decide on the future of Greece. The evaluation will have to go well beyond the mere economic calculation and should estimate the costs that an eventual output of Athens may result on the single currency and, as regards the political, diplomatic developments that could predict the consequences. The desire to give a lesson to Greece to serve as a warning to other countries might cost, including economic, much greater, than the retention of part of the debt greek in more or less short. The International Monetary Fund estimated that in Athens are needed over the next three years, about 50 billion euro, of which 36 to 14 new loans and reduction of interest; this means, implicitly, that the greek debt restructuring has become an obligation and that a refund, in whole or in part, it will never happen that in the long term and with the end of the rigidity of the budget. Essentially Athens serves invest to make money, raise the status of its social fabric and set aside part of the economic growth to repay past debts. Considering the manufacturing base of the country the starting point should include substantial investment to develop a production system that currently appears far from being able to contribute to this task. The beginning and then forcibly focused on reducing costs and increasing tax revenues, but that is not enough without a significant increase in the gross domestic product, but it can not be done without new investment. This scenario is played essentially the game of the solution of the Greek crisis, it is if you want to keep Athens inside the euro both if you want to overflow. However, the country must adopt in any case infrastructure to revive its economy, for which investment will come from abroad. The question is whether these investments will come from Europe or even should be sought in Russia and China, forcing Athens to come out as well as by the European Union even by the Atlantic Alliance? The question is crucial at a time of high tensions between the West and Moscow and is the real crux in foreign policy; not for nothing that the American pressure to prevent the exit from the euro has continued unabated. In any case, these considerations militate towards a solution, at least temporarily, that would enable Greece to maintain its position in the euro, because that is the epilogue that covers less cost, otherwise the chances of the scenarios will flow such as to overturn the current balance.