Israel and the new Syrian scenery and Middle Eastern

A Syrian military airport, located near Damascus, was struck by an Israeli attack; according to the Syrian government would be the third time that Tel Aviv would act militarily against the forces of Assad. Consistent with what has come before the government of Israel does not confirm or deny the incident; the reason for this raid is purely preventive against Hezbollah Shiite militia, allied to Damascus and supplied with weapons by the Tehran government. Precisely to prevent the transfer of arms to Hezbollah bases would lie the real reason Israeli action. The Tel Aviv attitude towards the Syrian regime, remains, however, all in all favorably disposed, provided that they are not exceeded certain limits laid down by the Israeli government, one of which is, precisely, that of not supplying arms to Hezbollah. This line of Israel has never been denied and has been pursued in time with the movement controls by land, or via air. Despite the lack of official relations between Israel and Syria, Tel Aviv prefers Assad in Damascus remains to power, with which it has established a co-existence, all in all, peaceful and has watched with concern the developments of the Syrian civil war in the country, due to the presence even among the democratic forces of opposition to the regime, a Sunni address, strongly oppose the existence of the Israeli state, despite these forces were substantially supported by Turkey and Saudi Arabia, countries with which Israel shares common interests in the region and with which, especially for Saudi, he shares the deep adversity toward Iran, however, financier of Hezbollah militias. The latest episode involved that would see Israel against Syria should be added, however, in a broader context, which is marked by the mutation of the variables in play: the entry into the field of Russia and the change of Turkey towards Assad. Beyond the groundlessness of the threats of the dictator of Damascus to Israel, which are unworkable for clear disparity of forces of the two sides, the question to ask is whether Russian support and the new Ankara's position may be harmful to Tel Aviv, or, if conversely, the new regional structure no substantial change for the Israeli state security. Relations between Putin's Russia and the Netanyahu government are excellent and also with Turkey the past difficulties have been overcome; the impression is that Russia has become a kind of majority shareholder of the Syrian regime, without which Assad would hardly have maintained their place in Damascus, and therefore, can influence the Syrian government in its behavior toward Israel. Moreover, Moscow has every interest in developing a network of alliances with neighboring countries to the US, as, indeed, Israel and Turkey, to counter Washington from the diplomatic point of view. The real unknown is the attitude of Iran, which, if it comes out the winner by the Syrian confrontation, to have eradicated the Sunni forces, it does not come out just as well from the point of view of international relations. Paradoxically, in fact, the victory in Syria, strengthened the anti Shia sentiment of several Arab states, especially in the Gulf, which now consider Israel a key ally to contain Tehran; this consideration would allow, as is already done, at the diplomatic level to overcome the age-old question of Palestine, which would rise in the second floor to the Arabs, to encourage more interest to the national territory. This kind of isolation of Iran, interrupted only by the business relationship with Russia and with the administration's threat Trump to cancel the agreements that followed the Treaty on the Iranian nuclear issue, could encourage activities against Israel through Hezbollah, with aimed at confirming Tehran as the sole defender of the most radical Palestinian struggle. It is a disturbing scenario that could bring a new element of alteration in the Middle East, resolvable only, perhaps, with the solution of establishing a Palestinian state. That did not seem to be in the Trump plans. The hypothesis of evolution of the scenario situation can cover an Iran less willing to suffer the isolation that seems destined, through not entirely diplomatic actions: could this be the next big challenge in the international scenario.