The scenarios for revitalizing the European project

The instability that is facing Europe, with the concurrence of the imminent UK output, the advent of Trump at the White House, the attitude of Putin's Russia and the wave of populism that crosses the continent, obliges what is the core of the founding partners to undertake the procedures capable of preventing possible disruptions. The basic intention is to communicate a message of aggregation on European Union project. The meeting, which will circulate it to Versailles, is restricted, being limited to France, Germany, Italy and Spain which may present a weakness against other States; the danger is that it passes the perception of being faced with a kind of directory, a certainly unwelcome feeling, especially for the more peripheral governments, those of the former Soviet bloc, that while watching with apprehension the activity to their neighboring Russian borders, do not fit yet, despite the economic benefits received, to take on the obligations that Brussels requires, both in the field of enforcement of rights, that the problem of migrants. Certainly the message you want to communicate is a signal against the output formalization of London, which will be official within the next few weeks, however, this meeting intends to go further and seek workable solutions to meet the needs that have arisen. Do not forget that the European Union's final goal was to create a political union, on this subject is necessary to reflect and to seek solutions capable of transcending a result that, at the moment it is impossible to extend to all 27 countries They have remained in the Union. The search for alternative and even more flexible possibilities, used to ward off an inevitable disintegration is you want to keep not shared objectives. So the choice seems obliged: aggregate the members of viable scenarios and narrow the field of acceptances moving towards more ambitious ties. The starting point, the basic one, remains the common market, which must ensure the movement of people and goods, with a fair distribution of rights and duties, should no longer exist simplified conditions as those for the United Kingdom, and the observance of these principles must be total and rigidly applied by making provision for sanctions to deter any convenient behavior. If you can understand who wants only to join this level of integration it is equally clear that the only common market is not sufficient for an effective union, represents only a kind of economic union to support businesses and create better conditions for development inside the 'area, but only if some rules will be changed in favor of redistribution of wealth. This must, however, be not absolutely but relatively to the degree of integration that states will want to choose, to avoid preferential treatment of the kind enjoyed by European countries, which have not adequately fulfilled their obligations. The concept may exceed the definition of two-speed Europe: you can, in fact, provide for more membership levels with benefits that go hand in hand with the obligations. A key aspect is that of defense, become urgent with the Trump intentions of giving less political and military weight to the Atlantic Alliance; Europe, it is undeniable, is unprepared in front of the international scene evolving: not a European army and the security services that are not integrated and do not willingly exchange the information in their possession. This state of affairs has to be overcome, it requires not the story but the record. One can conceive of a membership in the common European defense without belonging to a political union? The answer can be positive if you enter into treaties capable of giving a concrete answer to the national renunciation of the prerogatives of certain decisions in the military, it would conversely alliances but not common defense. It is a difficult challenge, which involves not only a financial investment, a political investment of no small importance, because in the Atlantic Alliance the slowness of the decision (which should not exist in the field of war) is matched by American power. Clearly a common defense project is not an alternative to NATO, but an autonomy does not allow Europe recently and the ability to play a major role at last on the international stage. The top step is represented by the political union, which is not completely debase state sovereignty, but shall include a set of centrally manage matters that need to be fully accepted by those who want to subscribe to this approach. This remains the real challenge.