Relations between the USA and Turkey are increasingly difficult

The mission of US Secretary of State Tillerson in Turkey has been very complicated. Relations between the two countries are at historic lows and there is a real risk of a diplomatic break, a scenario that until recently was not predictable. The question of US support for the Kurdish militias, traditionally allied with Washington, is only the last case of conflict between the two nations and represents a dangerous precedent of mutual threats, which could degenerate into armed conflict. Previously there were cases of visas denied to Turkish citizens by the US, followed by a similar measure by the Ankara authorities. One of the reasons for friction is the failure to extradite a Turkish preacher, resident in the US, who is believed to be one of the inspirers of the failed coup. All these reasons of friction are however secondary, if we consider the American perception, probably supported by concrete evidence, of the initial support from the Turks to the Islamic State, which was to be the tool to drop Assad and then transformed, thanks to huge financings, in a sovereign terrorist entity, which has subverted the order of Syria and, above all, of Iraq, a country in which the United States had been directly involved. The importance of maintaining good relations between the US and Turkey is also due to the fact that Turkey is the only Muslim member within the Atlantic Alliance, and for the United States, the permeability of Ankara in the Western alliance is considered an aspect indispensable in the face of the new world scenarios that are emerging. Washington fears that Turkey may end up in Russian influence; if this were to happen, Moscow would gain a strategic position on the Mediterranean and the Black Sea capable of increasing the apprehension of the countries that belonged to the Soviet bloc and which now fear Russia more from the military point of view. Furthermore, not being allied with one of the major Muslim countries would open an even clearer distance between the US and the Sunni world. One of the topics of discussion was the future of Syria: on this front Turkey seems to be particularly close to Russia, especially after Erdogan has identified Assad, after having fought it, a possible bank against the Kurds and their desire to constitute an entity sovereign on the borders of Turkey. The American position, although close to the Kurds, is not yet completely clear, just because Washington does not want to preclude any solution to have a better relationship with Ankara. On the future of Assad there is a wide divergence, proven by the support of Washington to the Syrian democratic forces, which are on the opposite front of the coalition in fact composed of Russia, Iran and, indeed, Turkey. It will be necessary to see how the talks will develop and whether the two sides intend to evaluate the relationship between the two states in a positive way. If with Obama it was understood how the distance between the two countries was justified by the political direction taken by Erdogan, with Trump one could foresee a sort of rapprochement, precisely because of the political inclinations of the current president of the United States. But as for Russia, the office of president is not enough to direct federal policy and therefore the diplomatic and military apparatus have kept the distance with Turkey. It remains to be seen whether this removal is still considered beneficial for powers outside the White House or if, on the contrary, a rapprochement that could prevent a definitive rupture has become necessary. Diplomatic work will not be easy: Erdogan does not want to give up fighting the Kurds and Washington can not betray faithful allies. However, Turkey does not seem to give up anything and the current situation is that there has only been a generic commitment between the two parties to find mechanisms capable of dealing with divergent issues. The respective positions remain distant and to this situation is added the probable agreement between Kurdish militia and regular army of Assad, which Damascus would be willing to use as a force of interposition between Kurds and Turks, to prevent them from further advancing in Syrian territory. If this eventuality were to materialize, the confusion among all the parties involved would be bound to increase again: in fact, the legitimate question is what will Russia do and what the United States will do if this new alliance were to become a reality.