Russia's lack of diplomatic reliability in the Syrian conflict

The Syrian civil war, for Russia, offered the great opportunity to allow Moscow to return to playing a major role; thanks to Obama's guilty lack of interest and Trump's isolationism, it was easy for Putin to occupy a space, which was also left free by Europe. So the Russian country was able to combine the protection of its area of ​​influence, represented by the protection of the dictatorship of Damascus with the need, to be able to spend internally, to return to being a world leader. The Russian intervention has thus materialized even under the insignia of the fight against terrorism, which have also been able to justify other objectives. In fact, however, Putin has also gained consensus in the western field, legitimizing his propensity for leading role, which had caused him so much success in the electoral field. Being involved in Syria has also allowed Russia to play skillfully on the diplomatic tables: making alliances, sometimes even uncomfortable and moving in the direction of traditional opponents. The rivalry with the United States, certainly not attenuated by the appointment of Trump as president, has increased, allowing Moscow to have approached from Iran, with whom it shares the protection of Assad and Turkey, that the circumstances are increasingly moving away from the Alliance Atlantica. If the Kremlin has tried to assert its ambitions also on other grounds, such as trying to influence elections in other countries, not only in the US, or having claimed its area of ​​influence with actions of dubious legality, as in Crimea and in Syria, Syria remains the main ground for asserting its political weight in the international context. However, in order to continue a linear action of international action, Russia must have allies, official or unofficial, who have no contrasts and move on a uniform line: but this is not the case. Turkish politics forces Erdogan to oppose any Kurdish entity that can aspire to the exercise of its own sovereignty, even within the dictatorship of Damascus and, above all, if these ambitions are sought to be implemented near the borders of Ankara. The military actions taken by the Turkish armed forces against Syrian Kurds are taking place on Syrian territory, which has already provoked Assad's remonstrances; it must be remembered that the Syrian Kurds were decisive for the role played by their infantry in the struggle against the Islamic State in these territories. Their action was essential not only for Syria, but also for the United States, with which they often joined and from which they received logistical support. It is probably not far from the truth to say that Turkish dislike of Syrian Kurds depends not only on their being Kurds, but also on the defeats inflicted on the caliphate formations that initially enjoyed funding from the Sunni states, including almost certainly also Turkey. The humanitarian situation occurring in the Kurdish areas, due to the Turkish intervention, is very serious and just as dangerous are the potential developments of an attack on the Kurdish areas where there are US military personnel. In this situation the only power that could play a role of intermediation is only Russia, still present in forces in Syria; however, the clear uncertainty of Moscow in assuming this role demonstrates how the Russian power is such only on the military level, while diplomatic action is characterized by excessive hesitation due to the inability to make a choice between Assad and Erdogan. If the first character is now enslaved to the Russian orbit, the second is considered a potential tool to damage the United States, but the Turkish invasion in the Syrian territory could prove to be counterproductive even for Moscow, also because it may have to manage an even more complicated situation if actual American armed forces were involved. This Russian diplomatic uncertainty appears in stark contrast to the military demonstration with which Russia has influenced the fate of the Syrian conflict. Certainly the direct involvement of a regional power like Turkey is a more complicated matter to manage than to fight militias in war by proxy of other states, who were careful not to expose themselves, but without the diplomatic action the Russian ambition to be considered a great power is left in half, substantially it is incomplete and therefore unreliable.