The US may try to limit Chinese influence in North Korea

In the speech at the beginning of the year the North Korean president Kim Jong-un affirmed his willingness to meet again with the American president Trump. The signal launched by Pyongyang highlights the need for the regime to see mitigated the economic sanctions that still affect the country's poor economy. The speech highlights how the North Korean regime considers the United States, at least on an official level, the privileged interlocutor to resolve its situation. Despite the expressed intentions, to proceed towards a denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, it appears, however, highly unlikely that the Pyongyang regime would actually operate in this direction. Without the atomic arsenal, North Korea is an easily attackable country and the same ruling dynasty would have little, if any, chance of salvation; not for nothing one of the topics of discussion with the United States was the guarantee of the safety of the North-Western leader. The meeting that took place in Singapore with Trump was an epoch-making event, because it constituted the exit from the total isolation of the Pyongyang leader and consequently the country, famous for not having another international relationship, except with Beijing . The United States, despite the usual declarations, seems to have accepted the impossibility of North Korea to renounce the nuclear arsenal and so it seems also for South Korea, which has achieved the result of a situation that ratifies a pact of non aggression, after the repeated meetings between the leaders of the two Koreas. The situation at this time would seem to be quieter, even if Kim Jong-un's appeal deserves careful consideration because it happened in the silence of China. One of Beijing's fears is that the US can try to get the North Korean country out of Chinese influence. If from the economic point of view North Korea can only offer the advantage of labor at very low cost, but without specialization, from the geopolitical point of view the border with China can represent an instrument of attraction for Washington, with the White House more and more concentrated in the competition with China. If the historical ties between the Chinese and the North Korean countries represent an obstacle that is certainly not secondary, it is also true that current relations have not improved since Kim Jong-un took power. China does not appreciate the unpredictability of the current North Korean leader and the continued attempts at new non-Trump relationships increase the distrust of Pyonyang. On the other hand, for the United States it could be a tactical advantage, understood as a means of pressure and disorder, on China to reduce sanctions against North Korea and perhaps even to provide economic aid capable of reviving the economy of Pyongyang. Trump has no problem having relationships with dictators in other parts of the world to get benefits for the United States. Certainly this could raise the level of the clash with Beijing, because it would bring a negative news for China in its area of ​​influence. The question of the commercial war between the two countries would see a geopolitical development able to raise tension: a scheme already applied by Trump in other contexts, that is to bring the contrast up to a dangerous limit, and then find an agreement. But if this system can have obtained favorable results (even with China on the issue of duties), it is not said that Beijing can respond positively to such an explicit invasion of the field. Moreover, if this hypothesis became real, the United States would find itself trying to exploit a highly unpredictable character like Kim Jong-un, able to take advantage of every opportunity to gain the greatest possible advantage and also be able to play simultaneously on several fronts. However, if the North Korean regime received economic aid deemed appropriate, at least in the short term could create the conditions to unnerve China and force it to some risky move. It will only be to see how much Trump will want to risk.