Turkey's intervention in Syria and its international consequences

The story of the Syrian Kurds highlights several factors in the development of international relations, not only in the Middle East area but on a global level. On the reasons of Turkey, the intention to recover the internal satisfaction, compromised by the poor performance of the economy and, together, try to resolve the issue of Syrian refugees, now badly endured in the Turkish country, transferring them to the territory stolen from the Kurds and resolving so two goals with one action. The consequences for Ankara can become too expensive for the goals set. Turkish isolation on the diplomatic scene is an inevitable factor, even if there is no unity of purpose between Europe and the USA, the action of Turkey will provoke a censorship that is difficult to make. On the economic side, it is unlikely that Trump will be able to avoid sanctions in Ankara, both because he promised them and because he will have to satisfy the sectors of the American administration that are against withdrawing from Kurdish areas in Syria. The Kurds, to avoid a massacre, of soldiers, but also of civilians, are forced to change allies after the US betrayal. Putin, in these cases, is usually skilled at exploiting the opportunities that the international scene gives him: the vacuum left by the Americans represents an opportunity for Russia to act alongside Assad, whose help was directly sought by the Kurds. But the American move, in addition to favoring Damascus and Moscow, can only favor Iran, which has always been on the side of the Syrians and the Kurds themselves, with whom it has fought side by side against the Islamic State. Moreover the Turkish invasion is favoring the liberation of the terrorists of the caliphate controlled by the Kurds, feeding the fears of a recovery of the Islamic State; what better reason to justify the entry on the scene by Syria, whose territory has been invaded by a foreign force, from Russia and Iran if not to fight the rebirth of the caliphate troops. According to some analysts, Trump's move would have been carried out to undermine the relationship between Moscow and Ankara, whose relations are very relaxed, so as to favor the supply of military systems by the Russians to an army of the Atlantic Alliance, which is always condemned by the White House. Until now the foreign policy of the American president has been a mixture of improvisation and incompetence and it seems very difficult that on his own he has succeeded in developing such a strategy, a strategy that could hardly have been suggested to him by an administration, especially the military side, which has the alliance with the Kurds is always held in high regard. In any case, the US has abandoned the Kurds, probably for an electoral calculation, according to the theorem that domestic politics is more important than foreign policy: an assumption that cannot be valid for the main world power. What will be the consequences of a possible armed confrontation between the Turkish forces and those of the bloc consisting of Russia, Iran and Syria? The risk of a regional war is very substantial, but the possible involvement of the Atlantic Alliance within a contest that, hypothetically could see it alongside the aggressors of its Kurdish allies, is equally serious. Certainly it is a remote hypothesis, but one that makes us reflect on the real need to maintain Ankara within an alliance in which it is now a member that seems not to share the reasons for joining. Fortunately, Turkey has not entered the European Union and with these behaviors has put an end to every remaining possibility of entering it; these assumptions, supported by other evidence of infidelity, should induce the Atlantic Pact to decree its expulsion. This is because we are not facing a two-way relationship as between the USA and Saudi Arabia or between the USA and Pakistan, where Washington continues to maintain alliances for its exclusive interests even against the evidence of the incorrect behavior of its allies, but because the Pact Atlantic covers a vast audience of countries which, by now, has divergent interests with Washington. If the United States wants to come out stronger from this affair, it will have to put at the center of its action not the particular interests, but the general ones, based on the common interest and on the principles: first of all to respect the allies, because the one made to the Kurds can potentially be repeated with any other ally.