The Russian strategy in the Mediterranean

Russia must live up to its geopolitical ambitions, to compensate for the distances that Moscow has towards the USA and China in terms of economic power and international political weight. Putin has for a long time set up an intervention strategy in regional crises of global interest, which have brought Russia back to the center of diplomatic attention. The Kremlin has identified the Mediterranean area as a primary interest in which to explain its action. One of the possible reasons is the political weakness of Europe and its high blackmail, through the management of migratory flows. But even before these reasons there is the need for a military presence, considered essential since the times of the Soviet Union within the Mediterranean, seen as a strategic factor for disturbing actions to American adversaries. One of the initial reasons for supporting Assad, in the Syrian issue, was the certainty of being able to dispose of the port of Tartus, for years based in the Mediterranean of the Russian navy. The progressive American withdrawal from its role as the first world power has favored the entry of Russian troops into Syria and the exercise of Putin's strategy of accrediting Moscow in the role of great power, even without having all the prerogatives of the case; however the action in Syria has given Russia solid foundations to play a primary role in the Middle East crisis, often alternating military actions with diplomatic initiatives and allowing to achieve the main objective, which was the maintenance of Assad, now dependent in all and for everything from the Kremlin. This also allowed a closer proximity to Iran, based on a common aversion to the United States and a mutual interest in maintaining the status quo in Syria. Now the range of action shifts to Libya; for some time the Italian influence has been greatly reduced, in the North African country a civil war is underway, also favored by the ambiguous French behavior, which has long had ambitions in Libyan oil reserves: a situation that denotes the presence of interests conflicting within the European Union, with Brussels not working to settle the issue, nor to create the conditions for an essential intervention, especially in the field of immigration. A framework where Russia identifies opportunities for its foreign policy. In practice, Moscow's ways of entering the Libyan scenario resemble an already proven scheme: the entry of mercenaries without insignia onto the battlefield alongside the non-legitimate government, to overthrow the executive supported by international public opinion. In a case of substantial equilibrium the entry of Russian mercenaries, who certainly do not move without the agreement of the Kremlin, would unbalance the situation against the Tripoli government; in parallel the Russian foreign minister undertook a diplomatic action where he asserts the opposite of the potential result of the intervention, implementing a classic tactic based on ambiguity to allow Russian forces to act undisturbed on the Libyan scenario; this would be the objective of gaining time to present the new situation now defined to the public. A Russian influence on the southern shore of the Mediterranean would be even more negative for the repercussions on the management of migration flows than on the energy issue. It could mean the constant presence of Russian military ships dangerously close to the bases of the Atlantic Alliance, as well as a proximity too contiguous with European countries, against which Moscow has tried to use its influence subtly, through cybernetic means on the occasion of electoral appointments. The image that Moscow provides of itself, internationally, is a substantial confirmation of a player who does not respect the rules and who becomes more and more enterprising in trying to enter areas usually under the influence of other states. This aspect should not be underestimated in order to be able to foresee and prevent future scenarios, an aspect that reaches almost the European borders and that should provoke an adequate European response from Brussels and accelerate those processes necessary to immediately manage situations like this; but also for the USA an alarm should be triggered that should not be underestimated: repeating the Syrian mistake would reduce the credibility of Washignton and its specific weight on regional areas, which, in some way, were controlled by American power.