With a negotiation, which could be defined as alternative, Orban's Hungary, opting for constructive abstention, as it has been imaginatively defined, allowed the European Council to proceed with the opening of negotiations for accession to the Union of Moldova and Ukraine. After repeated threats, the Hungarian president absented himself from the vote, with an unprecedented procedural innovation, which made it possible to achieve the result approved by twenty-six European countries, which also includes the start of Georgia's candidacy and the postponement of the evaluation to March of the accession process of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Orban, the only European leader to meet Putin since the beginning of the Ukrainian conflict, has always said he is against the start of Kiev's accession process, arguing that it does not meet the conditions for joining the EU, however, apart from the affinities with the regime of Russian and therefore political, Budapest could fear sharing European resources, which, in fact, financially support the Hungarian country, with the new members, with a consequent decrease in revenue from Brussels. Naturally, Orban's abstention was not free: beyond the threat of a request for funding of 50 billion for the functioning of the Hungarian administration for 2024, President Orban was "satisfied" with the release of 10 billion in funding, which they had been blocked due to the violation of fundamental rights by the Budapest government; rights that will certainly not be restored and this fact will also constitute a further dangerous precedent for the functioning of European politics, which can be overcome, as always, with the end of unanimity voting, a mechanism that needs to be corrected more and more urgently. The approach of the summit was entirely aimed at the result, where, in fact, it was preferred to create dangerous precedents to achieve the set goal, with a political vision, which necessarily had to sacrifice something, but which brought a result that was rightly celebrated. If the process is successful, the political value will certainly be successful, not only for the enlargement of the common European home, but also for the geostrategic containment of Russian ambitions. Nor should the fact of having accepted the ambitions of Georgia be underestimated, which could become a European member without geographical continuity with the other member countries and which could constitute an outpost of the Union capable of attracting other countries in the region. The decision strengthens European credibility and prestige, allowing us to interrupt the diplomatic obfuscation, which Brussels has demonstrated with decisions that are not always too congruent with its principles. President Zelensky averted an indirect victory for Putin, which would have raised Moscow's morale in the event of refusal towards Ukraine. The opening to Kiev means an unequivocal political result on a global level, which compensates, at least in part, for the refusal of the US Congress to release the 60 billion dollars for military aid; moreover, the Ukrainian situation in the conflict with Russia is at a standstill, the front is immobile and the progress that the Kiev government had promised to the West has not been recorded, while the Russian armies seem to be holding on to their positions. The European decision, combined with the consistent promise by some individual European states to provide military aid, can boost Ukrainian morale; Kiev and Moscow's commitment in the coming winter months should be to maintain their positions and prepare for decisive operations when weather conditions improve. In this period, European commitment may also be more incisive in the diplomatic field, despite Putin having declared that Western isolation has not produced major repercussions on the Russian economy and there is no further need to mobilize new military personnel; these declarations must be interpreted partly as justified by the upcoming Russian elections and partly by Moscow's ability to have been able to carve out a dialogue with powers both adverse to the USA, such as Iran, and close to Washington, such as Arabia. Europe, therefore, must know how to play an increasingly autonomous role from the USA, also in preparation for an unfortunate re-election of Trump, of which the admission of Ukraine, Moldova and also Georgia must be read as a process that is part of a plan superior capable of uniting European countries in an increasingly federal and political sense with autonomy in foreign policy and equipped with its own army, capable, that is, of overcoming the financial logic to be able to truly interpret the role of an international subject of primary importance.
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