Now more than ever Europe must be autonomous

 Beyond the unspeakable behavior of the new US President and his vice president, Europe's surprise at the new situation cannot be justified at all. The feeling of disorientation and urgency at being excluded from negotiations between the White House and the Kremlin, precisely because of Trump's will, over the Ukrainian issue is a significant blow to Brussels' authority and the reasons and requests to sit at the negotiating table seem to be of little value, despite the possibility of raising defense spending and, to a lesser extent, sending a peacekeeping contingent made up of European soldiers. The European Union had the experience of Trump's first presidency, where the uselessness of the Atlantic Alliance had already been declared and with it the end of the Western system, as it had always been known, and of the subsequent period: the four years of Biden's presidency, where it was possible to arrive at an advanced, if not definitive, point of a common European military force, capable of guaranteeing the autonomous defense of Europe; on the contrary, it was preferred to postpone the problem, hoping for the election of a democratic exponent, who could carry forward Western politics, as it has been since after the Second World War. A defense of Europe fundamentally delegated to the American presence, capable of making up for European shortcomings. Now this is no longer the case and the military defense policy is only the most immediate problem, which is intimately linked to the lack of a common foreign policy and to unitary intentions also in terms of the economy, which makes the Union weak in the face of the threats of American duties. A series of problems capable of uniting the entire European Union with Great Britain, which has awakened further away from the traditional alliance with Washington and much closer to the fears of Brussels. Europe is trying to start again with the proposal of the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, not to count the share of money destined for military spending in the budget restrictions. Although this is a very delicate matter, due to the various sensitivities of the nations that make up the Union, this solution appears to be a starting point, albeit late, for a strengthened defense policy, which will have to be followed by effective integration policies of the individual armed forces towards a common army, capable of defending the territory of the Union even without the support of the USA. This is an ambitious but more necessary objective: Washington, since the time of Obama, has directed its gaze towards its needs to protect the Pacific Ocean, in the context of competition with China and now Trump has decided to accelerate in this direction and this explains his commitment to the immediate involvement of Russia in the definition of the Ukrainian question; however, a negotiation where one party in the war is excluded is a negotiation that starts badly and Europe has done well to claim the presence of Kiev at the table of any negotiation and also of its own presence, precisely as a guarantee of Ukraine and of itself. A defeated Ukraine would only precede a possible Russian advance certainly towards the Baltic countries, Poland and Romania, which is Putin's real project to restore the status of a great power to Russia. Trump has a vision contrary to Western democracies, considering their values ​​outdated, but it is a very short-term vision towards what is still the richest market. Brussels must be able to move with this awareness, even re-establishing ties, which could go beyond commercial ones, with other very important subjects on the international scene, certainly China, but also India and Brazil up to the Central Asian republics, often eager to distance themselves from Russia. The first step, however, must be a total involvement of the members of the Union, without holding restricted meetings that leave out countries directly involved in contingent situations, such as the Baltic countries in the meeting called by Macron. To do this, in addition to what has already been said above, the Union must equip itself with faster regulations capable of overcoming the absurd criterion of the totality of votes for the approval of community laws and decisions and the ability to expel countries opposed to the unitary direction of European politics, such as Hungary. Ukraine's accession to the Union is a necessary fact and an insurance against Putin's policies, but it must be supported by an armed force capable of breaking away from the USA, an Atlantic Alliance less dependent on Washington, also in its ability to produce the armaments it could use.