Egypt is not bipolar

While Catherine Ashton, on behalf of the EU, met with the ousted President Mursi in the secret place where it is guarded by the army, the situation in Egypt is experiencing a moment of precarious balance. The rejection, which Mursi would also repeated the EU representative, to give the green light to a participation of the Muslim Brotherhood to a government of national unity, it does not change a situation that always sees the military in defense of the secular state, always opposed the sectarian forces, engaged in a struggle of attrition. It came so to create a situation with no apparent way out, that the army can not maintain long because subjected to international pressure, but also where the obstinacy of the Islamists seems impractical in the long run for organizational and logistical problems. This scenario, where the civil war option remains on the horizon, but that does not suit either party, in the eyes of observers outlines a situation of conflict of two forces that seem to have monopolized the national scene in a sort of bipolar division. In fact in the Egyptian social fabric there is a possible third way, certainly a minority, but that should not be underestimated in an optical resolution of disagreements between the two major forces. The aversion is the system of military footprint, albeit secular, is setting the confessional, which the government has neglected the needs of the country to Islamize Egypt, is making more and more converts. At the center of their attention and their demands for a political class absent, there are the improvement of the economic conditions of a country where 5% owns most of the national wealth, while the majority of the population is reduced below the level of poverty . But only improve the economic conditions and thus reduce the deep social inequalities is not considered sufficient, without increasing the use of political and social rights, which has not changed since the fall of Mubarak, nor with the Muslim Brotherhood, nor with the military junta. Egypt is still a country where the press is not free, where they act paramilitary groups and corruption is widespread. To coordinate these needs are primarily the April 6 Youth Movement and the Revolutionary Socialists. The footprint policy is evident because the methods of struggle are the strikes and protests in the streets against both sides of which reject the absolutist approach the upper echelons of the army, often compromised by the Mubarak regime of which retain the dynamics, but not the military as such and the process of Islamization of the institutions tempted by the Muslim Brotherhood and their allies the Salafis, who have betrayed the electoral mandate to bring the country out of recession and open it to the world through the spread of rights. The experience gained in the demonstrations against Mubarak, in 2010, gave this movement a certain capacity for action, limited only by the small size of the forces available if compared with those of the two major teams. The risk is that of being crushed by a comparison, which for the moment is essentially dualistic, however, interpreting a script less rigid, this movement can carve out of contention within a strategic space to mediate a dialogue between the military and Islamists. Trai two affinity with the latter is much more difficult for the profound differences in their respective goals while with the military dialogue on economic reforms could open up channels of communication relevant. It remains to be seen whether in the leadership of these movements there are alternative personalities able to cope and manage situations in a pragmatic who can go well beyond the political claims of belonging. If these capabilities are present and will emerge, then the role of these third forces can be anything but marginal.