The evolution of Al Qaeda

The alarm these days, cha led to the closure of several U.S. embassies in Arab countries to the threat of terrorist attacks, requires a reflection on the evolution of the main Islamic terrorist movement, Al Qaeda, which is, despite the decimation suffered, always at the center of religious radicalism coming from the Arab world. If the size of the largest terrorist organization is almost completely failed, after the military campaign that Washington has undertaken in different parts of the world and which culminated with the killing of Osama Bin Laden, Al Qaeda is not defeated. The terrorist organization has transformed itself from a movement with a vision of global action on many small hamlets, cha have the advantage of being less detectable and more militarily effective. Of course it is not far-reaching goals, currently the repetition of September appears highly unlikely, however the ability to keep pressure on countries with large shares limited but potentially devastating, plays a central feature of the very existence of Al Qaeda. The will of the military leaders of the organization was converted to the exigencies of survival of the organization identified in the ability to carry out attacks to frequent but minor impact, but that in any case as to create a strong impression in the media. The classic example is the recent terrorist act carried out in Boston. The implementing procedures will materialize then, in the presence of small cells, called sleepers, perfectly integrated into the social fabric of the host country, but unable to get into the action with modest notice, or even on its own independent decision. We understand that against an enemy so elusive big armies can not, but becomes predominant preventive action through intelligence. This is why many Americans were shocked by the interception of American security, but rather were in favor of paying the sacrifice of their privacy in exchange for greater security. But merely to prevent the action within the confines of the West of Al Qaeda is totally insufficient. Faced with the prospect of disappearing, to grow back quickly or to embark on a path of gradual re-growth of the movement, the leaders of Al Qaeda have chosen this last option, also because of the need for a reorganization more balanced and able to respond more elastic properties to world scenarios, not to neglect the weight of the economic crisis which has reduced funding and imposed a policy of maximizing the results compared with less effort, both organizational and financial. The differentiation of the geographical presence is one of the most successful factors for the continuation of the life of Al Qaeda, if the pressure of NATO in Afghanistan has forced its members to seek refuge in the valleys on the border with Pakistan without having quite right, the proselytizing in Africa, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, is the investment in human capital more substantial. The presence of a social fabric to the border with extreme poverty has been the most fertile breeding ground for Islamic extremists, who in a short time, thanks to alliances with local people has always been fighting for their independence, have expanded in very quickly their area of ​​influence. Also noteworthy is the case of Iraq, where the abandonment of the land of U.S. troops has plunged the country in absolute terror, because of an ongoing series of attacks carried out by local leaders of Al Qaeda. This case promises to be repeated in Afghanistan when the U.S. military will leave the country in the next year. What emerges is a very worrying because very fragmented and thus difficult to control at the global level. At this stage it is safe to say that among the members of Al Qaeda in Africa there are major differences from those Pakistanis, more like those of Iraq, and in this context to define Al Qaeda as a movement is only an analysis of gross and wrong, instead we need to identify the role of the vertices of the organization as catalysts of influence on the groups most new, without having, however, the direct ability of the hierarchical address. This peculiarity may be fine as long as the movement is still in a phase of reorganization, where the greater importance is that you send to the enemy, and the West as a whole or a local government subject to its influence, the feeling of being under attack, continually undergoing the terrorist threat. In contrast, in the medium to long term, the excessive fragmentation of this international Islamic terrorism, politically presents all its weakness and inconsistency. Too many situations of Pakistan, Somalia, Syria, and other countries where the action of Al Qaeda is explicit. If this element can discard the possibility of facing a monolith, with consequences that could also encompass scenarios of global war, the most urgent is faced with a structure that is given a military organization in the field of cell type, capable of performing attacks at any time. If prevention at the level of intelligence remains the most effective weapon, even a different approach to the needs of those people who have the most features to allow for expansion of Al Qaeda, could be a solution to go.