The new cold war Obama

Obama, in his electoral program , he predicted a foreign policy for the U.S., relieved by the perceived role as imperialist , to embrace a more lightweight approach , based on diplomacy as an instrument for crisis resolution . The massive withdrawal from Iraq , which eventually proved to be a tactical error , and progressive disengagement from Afghanistan, were to represent examples of the new direction . In fact it was imposed by the new American demands on the international stage , they see the Asian zone became paramount. In this context, the European order was taken for granted , relations with Russia , though not good , had to remain channeled into a respectful distance , so as not to create problems on that front . A new cold war has not even been scheduled . The story of the Crimea has upset the plans of the U.S. President , bringing the relationship with Russia again central to the diplomacy of Washington. The problem is that the nature of the relationship is poised to follow in the old days of the Second World War , with a return of the theorem of the balance of power . Of course it is no longer a bipolar confrontation essentially within the global dimension , but a comparison restricted to Europe. Moscow has lived as an invasion of its habitat the incessant presence in western Ukraine, which has violated that he intended his seat belt : a set of states favorable or neutral to Russia, which would allow Moscow to exert its dominance yet the former Soviet areas . With the conquest of the states belonging to the first Warsaw Pact , passed under the banner of NATO, Russia had already experienced a kind of usurpation to which he had to make the best of a bad situation. Already exponents as Gorbachev had warned of how the U.S. had gone too far. Try to go to the Russian borders proved to be a mistake which could be managed better. One of the weaknesses of the Obama administration 's own recklessness of U.S. diplomacy : these periods are punctuated by short-sighted and wrong choices that have contributed to compel the White House by the deviation of its intentions to pursue a foreign policy more secluded . Now the U.S. has to deal with the crisis with Russia without adequate preparation and being clearly unprepared to provide adequate response to Moscow's actions . The low level of penalties , much bandied about , is a clear example of the inadequacy of retaliation implementation , partly because of the inability to manage the plurality of present trends in allied countries , too conditioned by economic relations with Russia. Not have thought of a political, economic and , above all, energy , prior consultation with the allies , who could protect them from any disagreements with Russia, has put Washington in a disadvantaged position . Now, with Moscow in a position of advantage will be impossible to throw back at things practically made ​​and develop a strategy to counter the concrete . For the U.S., thus opening the way for the intensification diplomatic, new sanctions , which may not be shared by Europe, in other words a continuous state of tension with Moscow. This will not only bring American foreign policy to make choices, to which she was not prepared , set it in a different way and the need for fast choices could be a bad adviser and lead to big mistakes .