Ukraine: the obscure points in the Russian strategy

The Russian strategy in Ukraine is now expected to distance themselves from militias coaster. While underlining , as did a spokesman for the Kremlin , which is responsible for recent violence can be attributed to the western states , Moscow is distancing himself from those who have chosen to follow the path federalist with weapons in hand . It is a distancing late after Russia , after having taken the Crimea, has stirred up , even with its agents , populations thread Russian eastern Ukraine , coming to deploy about 40,000 effective immediately as soon as its armed forces over the boundary line with Kiev. The result was to have vreato the conditions of civil war , which , at best , will leave Ukraine profoundly destabilized and weakened internally. It does not matter if the wire Russians have been used for the purposes of the Kremlin and now threaten retaliation heavy forces in Ukraine. Of course you can also contemplate the possibility that the Russian tactic is beyond the control of Moscow because of the influx, in the eastern regions of fighters of different nationalities and also suspected of terrorism because they come from the regions of the North Caucasus . The problem of lack of involvement of the entire population of the eastern regions , in contrast to what happened in the Crimea , is a factor that could not be covered by the strategists Russians, for a favorable outcome . However, the presence of these factors does not affect the tactics fielded by Moscow , which provided a range of different results. If the success in the Crimea was not easily repeatable , creating a situation that would lead to a very serious instability , could be a result not altogether difficult to conquer. It should be noted that , for Putin , it was essential to weaken the sense of encirclement that suffered western Russia and to achieve this goal that you could not switch between Ukraine, attempted entrance into the EU and NATO orbit , but crossed by enormous economic difficulties with ethnic and social tensions aggravate easily. The conquest of the Crimea was the actual domain on the main Russian military base in Moscow, but also the start of large-scale destabilization of Kiev and laid bare the lack of unity of purpose between the U.S. and EU , scoring an international hit for Putin indirect , which mitigated , for now, the international isolation and sanctions. Now the Kremlin can afford to shift to the west responsibility for the situation in Ukraine , despite having been in Moscow provoke it , just for the timid attitude of the Western powers and non-unique , exercising its influence as mediator on the issue of observers of ' OECD . The Russian attitude , however, remains ambiguous and largely unreliable for a negotiation for peace, if at the time Putin seems to come out the winner, the feeling is that in the long term Russia will have to devise other strategies to escape the self-imposed limitations that is to pursue a policy too nationalist nostalgia with high-power primary degree that is permanently lost , not so much from the lost influence over Eastern Europe , as from not having understood the challenges of globalization. If the U.S. were the first world power it must, in addition to enormous resources , improved adaptability , despite all the difficulties, the new world scenarios , which Moscow has been shown not to have, having , by now , well over one step below the importance conquered by Beijing, which , however, is not yet the political point of view , on the same floor of Washington.