USA errors in the management of the Middle East crisis and the need to deploy its troops against the caliphate

The conquest of Ramadi, part of the Islamic State is only the most significant point, which shows that the approach of the US strategy, with regard, not only of the caliphate, but also of the way they deal with the Syrian civil war have been completely wrong. The first step was to give too much power to the Iraqi Shiites in the administration of the country, relegating the Sunni majority to passive actor of the political process. The second point was that, in honor election promises, to abandon Iraq militarily too early, thus defeating the efforts made in human lives and financial by the Member States. The third mistake was the approach adopted with Syria not to intervene, or at least engage in the creation of a coalition against Assad, Obama has gone beyond merely uncertain promises about the disposal of chemical weapons, while on the field were not supported enough forces democratic factor that favored the progressive reinforce fundamentalist militia, supported by the countries Sunni US allies, with whom he has missed quite a coordination due to a substantial difference of opinion, which has allowed us to reach a compromise acceptable to the two parts. From this aspect follows directly the development of the Islamic state, escaped the control of the Sunni countries lenders. The expansion of the caliphate, which has always proclaimed his goal of uniting Iraq to Syria, in a single state entity subject to the law of Islam, has been overlooked for too long, considering it as an unachievable ambition carried out by terrorist militias, therefore easily neutralized only by military air actions. By contrast the development of the conflict showed that it was a sort of reaffirmation of traditional warfare, where the most important element is the occupation of the land and the battles fought by infantry and mechanized means. If not the contribution, while important, aviation, whose caliphate does not have, it would be decisive: in contrast to the current situation. A central plank of Obama has always been to not allow US military and consequently Western Middle East to intervene on the ground. This condition was not given by the need to have more dead Americans killed in the Middle East, in order to avoid this opposition on American soil and coming essentially from both major US parties. The Chairman of the White House was counting on a preparation Iraqi army major, also to favor the appearance of a confrontation between Sunnis, that would result in a non-religious significance of the conflict. The huge misjudgment of the real military capability of the military in Baghdad, who repeatedly have fled in the battles against the men of the caliphate, while relying on a greater number of staff and technical equipment coming straight from the arsenals USA , it was probably the biggest mistake of the US administration, but it was not the only one. From the political point of view are several mistakes that helped to precipitate the situation. The first was to allow, because of the structural deficiencies of the army of Iraq, Iranian assistance. Tehran has a large military capacity and was placed, immediately to engage on the ground, but this allowed what Obama wanted to avoid: the confrontation between Shiites and Sunnis. The immobility of the Gulf states, towards a greater commitment on the ground has helped to promote the intervention of the Iranians, who do not move free, but to increase its influence as a regional power. But what relieves pressure from Sunni states on the caliphate, which seek to use instrumentally against the advancing Shiite. On the other hand Obama needs help in the field of Iranian men, who are the only ones, along with the Kurds, can impede the advance of the Islamic state. Even the soft attitude toward Assad, however, denied by the White House, but in fact can be used as a dike to contain the caliphate, has led to a perceived lack of clarity on the part of the US administration. As already said the United States believed in a greater collaboration of Sunni states, who have used their resentment to the agreement on the Iranian nuclear, to exercise some sort of retaliation to Washington, also functional to prevent Iranian influence in Damascus. Now, despite denials of the US, on the fate of the conflict with the caliphate, the need to change the strategy of the conflict exploded in all its urgency. At first we tried a greater involvement of the Sunni tribes, contrary to fundamentalism men of the Islamic State, but their attitude does not ensure a complete count because of the presence of the variable represented by Shiite fighters; has already said most complete unreliability of the majority Iraqi army, which is militarily reliable only with regard to selected departments and directly trained by the Americans. This scenario would require a radical choice: deploy new real Americans and Westerners also on the ground. The choice is weighted by the US authorities, but it appears, at the moment the only effective deterrent, both militarily and politically against the caliphate. Because military operations in full harmony with the air force would be deployed more effectively combined with technical expertise and availability of weapons, which should ensure a safe proposition, even in terms of time, against the Islamic state and, below, would guarantee a defense of the land in any phases, immediately after the conquest of territory. Contraindications include, in addition to the financial commitment, the possible victims, that the commitment in the field may determine. This is a significant psychological impact on American civil society. From the point of view of international law it is difficult to have secured coverage of the Security Council, but it could be studied a form of alliance with the Iraqi government. If for Iraq this option is more feasible, not so for Syria. But not settle the Syrian situation, regulation only where that Iraq may not be sufficient. The US push for supremacy of the secular forces, the Sunni states to moderate religious forces, Iran and Russia to maintain the power of Assad. A political solution could be to divide the country Syria, leaving Assad clan area closest to the sea, to the Kurds their territory, the area of ​​Damascus to the militias and the secular area the border with Iraq to moderate Sunnis, who It should be accompanied by a contingent maybe formed by Sunni nations to safeguard any possible revival of the caliphate. This is a possibility which is required intense diplomatic work, which should see the same table were enemies, but all still interested in seeing stabilized regional balance, no more subjects with subversion, danger and instability.