Turkey as a variable in the war against the Islamic Republic

The variable Turkish is the real question of this phase of the struggle to the Islamic state. For Turkey, the main objectives are not coincident with those of the United States and despite having allowed the Air Force to bomb the Washington Caliphate starting from their bases in exchange seems to have got the green light to hit positions of the Kurdistan Workers Party. Ankara for the presence of the Islamic state is a temporary factor, which is not seen as destabilizing in the long term, is, that is interpreted as a loser in the medium term. For Turkey, the main objectives are, first of all prevent the creation of an independent Kurdish state and to overthrow the Assad regime, to establish a zone of influence, basically Sunni Syria. Washington has different objectives: the first, first is to eradicate the caliphate, that is not assessed as a danger transient but able to expand in a growing its sovereignty in the Middle East. The assessment Turkish seems vitiated by reasons of expediency, which does not suggest a perception of reliable ally; suspect fact is that Ankara considers instrumental action of the caliphate of their own interests. The Islamic State is the enemy of both Assad, that the Kurds, the same enemies of Turkey and from there follows the substantial goodwill with which the state turkish treated so far the Sunni fundamentalist forces. It seems evident a real military and political calculation, which includes the desire to exploit the military successes of the fundamentalists, then, maybe, to fight them at a later time or when the Turkish targets are within easy reach. Until now, in fact, the behavior of Ankara towards the Islamic state has been very ambiguous and a source of concern by the United States, to which the faithful seemed loose. The White House has lobbied on Turkey, because an array explicitly against the Caliphate had a double advantage: on the one hand the logistics, represented by the proximity of its military airfields to the positions of the Islamists, on the other side of a political, because Turkey This is the only Muslim state in NATO. However, the strategic calculus of political Washington does not seem to have given the price charged by the turkish country, represented by the fight against Kurds. It must be recalled that the Kurds, not only far but still present, are much more important in the economy of Turkey's war on the Islamic state, deploying, along with the Iranians, the only ground troops efficient against the caliphate, a factor that allowed the garrison and the recapture of several areas to Iraqi and Syrian. With the Turkish bombardment against the Kurdish Kurdistan Workers Party, close allies of the Iraqi Kurds, it is likely to trigger a war within a war, which can only benefit both the Islamic state, which Assad's Syria. It seems clear that the calculation of the Pentagon was at least reckless, and risks to be added to the errors that have dragged the Middle East in the current situation. One can not consider the actual conduct of Turkey not as bad as it was handled the situation in the country of Iraq, with the government left hand only to Shiites, nor any reaction to the repression of Assad, who started the war Syria, which could weaken the regime immediately favoring the secular opposition. By analyzing the behavior of the US it seems to be dictated by an approximation of concern arising from the lack of an accurate overview of the overall picture of the situation, to which must be added a stillness military, which relies solely on the use of the weapon air, with ' commitment of some teacher on the field and supplies increasingly parsimonious. In this framework, alienating the trust of the Kurds appears a strategic suicide hardly comprehensible. It would have been very different if the US, before agreeing on the use of Turkish bases, had lavished considerable effort in the recovery and development of the peace process between Turkey and Kurds. It must be specified that Erdogan has suffered not just the statement of the Kurdish Socialist Party, also voted by the Turks, which prevented him from reaching the absolute majority and therefore to change the constitution. This fact has not been caught in an appropriate manner by the American analysts, because it represented a desire for revenge of President turkish, which materialized with the bombing of Kurdish bases. The assessment of Erdogan as an ally, is a further weakness in the general framework of the fight against the Islamic state and the definition of the scenario of the Middle East: President turkish can not be trusted, even in a state of emergency, as it should have been regarded as current by Pentagon planners. Erdogan has the only objective to achieve its purposes and not sporadic bombardment of peripheral stations of the caliphate to ensure reliability; so the question is whether it makes sense to put at risk the strong alliance with the Kurds only to use military bases are closer to the territory of the Islamic state. A hypothetical answer may be to have a plan that includes the creation of Kurdistan only subtracting territory Iraq, where the Kurdish community already enjoys considerable autonomy and exerts virtually its sovereignty, but definitely excluding instances Kurdish in Turkey and adjusting with devices in favor of Ankara, the possible division of Syria, which could result in a zone of Kurdish autonomy. This hypothesis seems the most likely, but implies a progressive diplomatic work whose results can not be taken for granted. Meanwhile the war continues against the caliphate and the contribution of troops to the Kurdish land remains essential. However there is a risk that the Turkish Kurds are distracted from their duties against the Islamic state to take action against Ankara; This danger is real because it has already occurred and is likely to widen again. Turkey seems to insist on this path because doing so reduces the possibility of a Kurdish autonomy in Syria, the Syrian Kurds without the support of those Turks can not reach; This is even more motivated because between Kurds and Assad's forces would be going on a tacit non-aggression agreement to facilitate the arena against Sunni militias; one more element for Ankara to fight Kurdish. But Americans should properly evaluate this situation that weakens the military facility against the caliphate, because the fighters lay Syrians are not judged ready to lead a fight on the ground against the Islamic Republic and the Syrian regular forces, so the only way seems be to promote peace, or at least a dialogue between Ankara and the Kurds, so Kurdish fighters continue to work for the United States on the ground.