The scenario Syrian

The debut of the Russians in the conflict in Syria is taking place in a soft, sort of Crimea Asian, but that seems to presage developments more different. Moscow has never denied support to Assad, but until now had kept away from the conflict, in homage to its strategy in foreign policy, which prohibits interference in the affairs of a foreign state. This principle can, however, be overcome if the Kremlin identifies direct interests for their own strategies. Some cases of the Crimea and eastern Ukraine are very different, because at that moment Moscow considered them, and considers areas of exclusive, for geopolitical reasons and for the presence of citizens of Russian origin; We can not say the same of Syria as a whole, but only for the base of Tartus, which is the only Russian naval landing in the Mediterranean. From the strategic point of view the presence of the naval fleet for Moscow is a point on which no compromise: in spite of all the movements determined by the new world balance, the Mediterranean Sea is still a central point in the foreign agriculture policies of states that aspire to play a role prominent in international politics. But only this aspect is not just a commitment that seems destined to become important and lets on direct involvement in person in a war that threatens to haunt the Kremlin leadership. The central point is that Russia fears a rise to power in the country Syria, once, somehow you were able to eradicate the Islamic state, by the US-backed secular formations. This change, if it occurs, from the scenery which is very far for the serious delay of military training of the militia which Washington assists, would shift influence on Syria, Russia and Iran to the West. The problem for those who must go to the support of the Syrian village that is able to form in the future is becoming increasingly evident as time goes on, in a general situation that appears to be characterized by all against all, a factor that continues to encourage control territory by the caliphate. The evolution of the situation in Syria can find a variety of stakeholders to affect more or less directly to Syria, considered essentially regional strategic balance. Assad is the first figure in this context, out of hand, a situation from which he could get out in a dignified manner, loosening the iron grip on the country through concessions attenuated agriculture policies that would allow him to retain power and avoid the carnage that is going on for four years; then there are the Sunni countries, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, for the first, who tried to take advantage of the civil war from the start, helping the fundamentalist militia, who then have escaped their control by becoming an Islamic state. The intentions of the Sunni countries were to subtract the country to Iranian influence in Syria. Despite being allies of the United States they have played and, to some extent continue to play a game whose goal is very distant from that of the White House, Ankara, for more uses war to the caliphate to adjust their accounts with Kurdish fighters. The latter, too, US allies, pear trees which have so far done the job on the ground, waiting for the reward of the establishment of a sovereign Kurdish nation. They have been betrayed by permit and US silence that preceded the bombing of their positions by the Turks. Iran is the main ally of Assad and the one most interested in the situation does not change policies; It has committed itself from the beginning with its auditors in the repression of the democratic uprising and later against the Islamic fundamentalist Sunni Islamic state. In part it has already failed in its objective of maintaining Assad control over all of Syria, but it was crucial to prevent its only final exit. Russians have already been discussed, there are only France and the United Kingdom, that, urged by the problem of refugees trying to enter the conflict without a proper view, however, that is a common factor to all stakeholders. For the past remain the United States, characterized by political uncertainty, without a general plan on Syria, they proceeded to attempts result of improvisation, which have not reached any RESULT OF relief. Obama's foreign policy has been weak, but Syria has been anything but a statesman, merely a role totally out of scale for the importance of the United States. It remains true, however, that could not count on reliable allies ele United Nations itself have been unsuccessful in dealing with the Syrian issue. These divisions, which were to be set aside to combat terrorism, have fostered the advance of the Islamic state and the escape of biblical Syrian civilians, forced to suffer grief, violence, famine and serious health situations, the behavior immediately from all sides involved. Now it seems that the urgency is more important to defeat the caliphate and it gives back to Assad the real possibility of being identified as a lesser evil and therefore allows him to continue to play a political role in Syria. If this approach is understandable, it is also true that means postponing a problem that more concrete because the presence of Assad will make impossible the pacification of Syria, that risk to be in a constant state characterized by a lack of internal balance. In this case applies more than ever the diplomatic solution, to reach a compromise between all the international actors who helped create the civil conflict in Syria. Without some form of agreement where everyone will have to give up something you will endanger regional stability somewhere in the world that is too important to find its equilibrium not to affect the world.