The differences of the strategy of the Islamic state to Al Qaeda

The recent attacks that the Islamic state has made outside its borders have a definite military strategic significance, perhaps even more than political. At the beginning of the emergence of the Caliphate, this organization, has differentiated it clearly from Al Qaeda, which had been the formation of Islamic terrorism more important to the goal pursued, that is, the creation of a territory under its sovereignty, a genuine state governed by Islamic law interpreted in the most radical, to be proposed as an example for all Muslims in the world. To pursue this goal in a peaceful way was logically impossible, but the use of arms must be within specified limits: those identified within the Syrian and Iraqi borders, which gave birth to the initial Islamic state of Iraq and the Levant, then he became just Islamic state or caliphate. In contrast, Al Qaeda has never been shown to have the ambition to create their own state, but to be a terrorist organization, which identified the affirmation of radical Islam through terrorist acts directly within the confines of his enemies, identified in ' West. If, initially this mode of action had met with consensus among radical Muslims, the general view has always been marred by a limitation of the horizon of the objective, which always seemed too narrow. Al Qaeda, in essence, it went well, as part of religious, until it appeared another subject, which presented a more ambitious goal. This dualism is not born by chance, but has matured over time, right inside Al Qaeda, where people dissatisfied with this limitation, they operated a detachment, identifying the possibility of exploiting large social sectors, initially located primarily in Iraq, characterized the deep dissatisfaction of the management of the political process of passage that has characterized the post-Saddam Hussein. This mismanagement, due largely to the Americans favored the Shiite on Sunni, until then dominant, without an equitable redistribution of power, which was handed over completely to the Iraqi Shiite country. The deep aversion that has resulted in the Sunni tribal groups and the remaining parts of the Bath party, the only political party allowed in Saddam Hussein, has been the basis for the creation of an Islamic state. A similar path was taken in Syria, where the extremists divided into various groups, have been fascinated by politics from Iraq, which propagated the creation of a new matrix Sunni caliphate. With this background it is understandable that military action should focus in the territories, which had to be won over to the cause. The Islamic State, while not hiding the deep aversion to the West and the Muslims themselves whose attitude toward religion was considered cool, do not show any interest to take military action outside the perimeter that you were assigned. The situation has changed profoundly with the interventions of foreign powers against the militias who fought under the black flags of the caliphate and were to be an obstacle to expansion and strengthening the rule of Islam. This scenario is the basis of change in military strategy of the Islamic state, which hit Ankara, Beirut, Russia, through the attack on the aircraft Russian and France. Other attacks were repeated in Baghdad, but not to do fall within the change in strategy, because the Iraqi capital is beginning in the expansionist goals of the caliphate and is the first enemy to fight for the exercise of sovereignty in the territory excluding any ' Iraq. The other affected countries are part of a logic of retaliation for the use of their fighters against armed Islamic state. Certainly for the West has more prominent media, certainly not so right, a bomb attack in Paris, or even against the Russian aircraft, compared to Beirut or even to Ankara, but the indication that the Islamic state wants giving it unique: the countries were affected to dissuade to continue fighting the caliphate. An additional element in support of this thesis is the lack of rhetoric of Al Qaeda, which presented their attacks as a result of a clash of civilizations, often putting the reason for claim the elusive goal of annihilation of the West. For now, the Islamic state is far from this table, in the future if, unfortunately, were unable to reach its goal of stability of the country with sharia, could groped to give themselves a more ambitious, but for the moment his horizon It is enclosed within the boundaries that you are given. This consideration is however not at all reassuring: the Islamic state is the only terrorist group in the world to be able to impose a sovereignty comparable to that of a state entity in the world. The military force that has the ability to mobilize and outside its borders has demonstrated absolute efficiency and ultimately be a more formidable enemy of Al Qaeda, because more structured and with more ambitious targets, but these considerations are also made by members of the same Al Qaeda, which have not yet been able to develop an alternative strategy for supremacy in the Islamic fundamentalist galaxy. The real risk is that, to give it a try and even existence, Al-Qaeda carries out an action that is part of its tradition, namely, to make similar attacks against the West, to meet that part of the extremism that like to see hit the West. This risk should not be underestimated because the competition between the two souls of fundamentalism is still strong, although some analysts have pointed out that the debate is underway for a possible merger, as a result of assessments of military opportunities, between groups.