The diplomatic activity of Russia in Syria can bring a new balance

The diplomatic activity that takes place on the issue of Syria, shows a picture of profound variability and where it appears that there is still no uniform situation. The true strategist seems to be Putin, who is using the Syrian situation to gain an advantage for Russia in the international arena, after isolation and the kind of jobs the second floor following the fall of the Soviet Union; the rest was in the electoral programs of the Kremlin chief to revive the image of Moscow, to play a role of the first level on the international stage. The entry of Russia in the Syrian war has definitely encouraged Assad, however, the dictator of Damascus, while retaining its power, now appears a functional tool to the cause of Moscow. This element should also be read in the American anti key, in fact, for Washington the departure of Assad scene had to be a target country in the setup of the future: it will not be so. The US, in Syria, have failed every way because of being too cautious and certainly not worthy of the first major world power. Putin has been adept has exploited this uncertainty and to enter into the question to reverse the situation of isolation in which it was Russia. If at first it seemed that Moscow was alongside Assad to maintain control that Damascus allowed him on the only Russian naval base in the Mediterranean, the course of the war and, above all, diplomatic arrangements, which followed, they did take second fore the question of the base of Tartus, in favor of the contacts that Moscow diplomacy has created. The Kremlin, for that matter, has not only taken advantage of the weakness of the White House against Damascus, but also the deterioration of relations between Washington and Ankara, recovering the relationship with Turkey. In addition, the convergence of interests on Syria, has allowed a military cooperation between Russia and Iran, which seems to open big potentiality in relations between the two countries. It appears even secondary that even China is aligned on Russian positions regarding Syria. So far these are the convergences, the common points of different countries, often at odds, which are outlined on the international stage, a scenario that presents Moscow, essentially as the lowest common denominator. In fact, the Kremlin has created a network of relationships, where is central, but they seem to have little chance to develop, unless Russia does not intend to proceed separately in relations with these states. This vision, however, contrasts with the intention to create a kind of network that would create an alliance able to balance the Western power. Here, then, that the lack of uniformity of this potential alliance emerges in all its evidence. We start from Turkey: Ankara has pursued a long goal now unreachable, to recreate an area of ​​influence that could trace, at least in part, the area of ​​the Ottoman Empire; to do what Erdogan, initially supported by good economic situation, has focused in too decided, on the relationship between religion and politics, transforming the country from sectarian and secular compressing the civil and political rights. This address was the start of removal from the US and Europe, but Turkey had to compensate for this distance exerting a gravitational pull of the Arab countries. Furthermore this strategy involved the indirect use of terrorist groups to overthrow the Syrian regime, in alliance with the Sunni monarchies of the Persian Gulf. Turkey has, however, found itself in an increasingly difficult international position, exacerbated by US pressure and its own internal situation. The agreement signed with Moscow has, therefore, represented a way out, favored by not properly democratic nature of the two governments. However, Moscow has also opened a channel with Iran, a Shiite country and therefore already opponent for definition of Ankara. A convergence between these countries appears to be impossible, especially if linked to the fate of Syria: on one hand it may be true that Turkey, at this stage, you focus more on your own situation, which is not on Syria's fate, preferring rather to follow the Kurdish issue, but when it comes to start the real negotiations and their Syrian fate, it seems difficult that the interests of Ankara and those of Tehran may coincide. At that point the relationship with Russia, which has a more similar to that of Iran, could be compromised. This could create new clutch situations and alter the difficult balance created by Moscow. There is also the possibility that the Kremlin has promoted the current situation with a time horizon not too far, but only to embarrass the United States and create a favorable situation to be exploited for the Ukrainian issue. Putin, has a very wide horizon is now clearly established thing, and this may be a valid assumption; but to achieve this, the lead role in Syria, must be played in full. Reach an agreement, however small, with Washington, on the defeat of the Islamic State is definitely the first step. Russia has earned this role with the commitment on the field and this factor will be decisive in the future. What seems less easy it will hold together, and not just a hypothetical table of negotiations for the future of Syria, all these indirect and unlikely allies that Moscow has put together, especially if the intention will always be to create problems in Washington.