Mosul's conquest does not avoid the danger of terrorism

With the fall of Mosul, the territories that are still under the sovereignty of the Islamic State have been greatly reduced: it is estimated that, under the rule of the Caliphate, it would remain the equivalent of about a third compared to its maximum expansion. The news of the recovery of osul by the Iraqi forces is certainly positive, but it is not a point of arrival, because there is a 400-kilometer-long band of caliphate, located between Iraq and Syria. From this portion of territory is the offensive of the Islamic State against military occupation, in these territories the caliphate can still enjoy substantial support and it is likely to think that the strategy of the survivors of the Islamic state is to retreat to these areas, Then try to resume military action. There may be some Taliban-like tactics in Afghanistan, which use the valleys along the border with Pakistan to carry out their attacks. On the other hand, the situation in Iraq, from the point of view of the relations between Shiites, now the country's command, and the Sunni is still not pacified and, once the euphoria of the reconquest has ended, it seems unclear to fear that the problem can be re-emerged with all Its destabilizing consequences already experienced. We must try to predict what the strategy the Islamic state will want to pursue in order not to disappear altogether or to undergo any kind of repression of what has hit Al Qaeda. Probably the Caliphate wants to play simultaneously on two different levels: the maintenance of the territories where it is still stationed and the increase of terrorist acts, which were formerly a secondary mode. With the loss of sovereignty, on the contrary, terrorist action becomes at least of the same strategic weight, military conduct so far and subjugation to the Islamic law of the conquered territories. The reconquest of these territories, both on the Syrian and Iraqi sides, must become essential for the ultimate defeat of the Islamic state, even in the preventive sense of possible terrorist acts. It should be remembered that the attacks in the West are those that have a greater media coverage and, although very serious, were far less than those in the Iraqi country. The mobilization capacity of the Caliphate in Iraq is combined with a presence in the area that is still high and more than enough to conduct a campaign of attacks capable of destabilizing a state where power, after the fall of Saddam Hussein, has not yet been sufficiently Divided between Shiites and Sunnis. So, beyond the important military victory, which led to the re-conquest of Mosul, the action to defeat the Islamic state must cover other spheres of scenario management; Shi'a preponderance and Iranian support, determinants of military victory, could, if not mutilated, be a weakness of the system, which could give way to the caliphate, essentially Sunni expression, to return very dangerous. However, limited to an analysis of the internal situation, without considering the international interests involved, is not enough. If there was tacit collaboration with Obama with Tehran, Trump's advent disarmed American action, which was again focused on the Sunni monarchies of the Persian Gulf; Now the attitude of the Saudi kingdoms and Turkey to the Islamic State has been unclear, especially for the value that these states gave to the caliphate in anti-Syrian and anti-Shia. On the other hand, a coalition, albeit not official, between the Russians and the Iranians has emerged around the Shiites, which seems to be made to go against US interests. For the defeat of the Caliphate much will also depend on how the Syrian affair will be resolved, the end of which seems to be far behind. Syria's interests could alter the very fragile balance that allowed some sort of international coalition against the caliphate and create a fracture capable of going beyond the Islamic State, highlighting a religious-based, but integrated and sustained, To powers outside the area. Within this dualism, terrorism could be new force, as performers of tasks not possible for national states, but functional to their own interests. The hypothesis is not far off, because it has already contributed in the past to the emergence of movements that have then flowed into the caliphate. So it is necessary to look beyond the military affairs of the Islamic State, because the worst threats in the brink of integrity are unfortunately very present and concrete in the Iraqi scenario.