European Union intervention is needed to stop secessionist instances

The European Union officially takes the position on the Catalan issue; through the Commissioner to the Economy Pierre Moscovici, Brussels states that the problem is of an internal order to the Spanish state and that, however, the Union recognizes only Spain as its own Member State. The reason for this position is certainly institutional, for Brussels to say in favor of Barcelona, ​​it would mean an intrusion into Madrid's issues, but this caution proved by the Union seems to be also func- tional to bring to light every other possible autonomy of other territories , which would be a dangerous alteration of European balances. If these reasons can be understood, one can not fail to notice how Brussels's attitude towards Scotland was different, even if it was caused by the unconvinced attitude towards the UK part of Europe and concluded, when leaving the Union. But the European Commissioner, in addition to condemning the violence of the Spanish police and hoping for a solution to the issue-definition dialogue, has identified a very important political reason, which is one of the main causes of the request for autonomy by some regions . Certainly for Catalonia there are reasons like central Madrid's aversion to central power, coupled with the republican feelings prevailing in the region, however, the European Commissioner identifies in the wealth of the Catalan region the main reason for the request for autonomy; in fact, part of this wealth is taken from the central state and this has been experienced as an injustice, capable of altering the feeling of unity. Basically, the existing problem is the unequal and homogeneous development of the different regions of a state. If, for the central state, the logic, even shared, is to try to redistribute resources from the richest regions to the poorest ones, one can not understand how discomfort in areas with higher development rates leads to shapes of will to leave the national state. The Spanish case could be confined to greater autonomy in Catalonia, which was rejected and left more resources in Barcelona but this would have caused resentment in other parts of the country and would have caused variations in the Spanish budget. This is a common problem with other European states, where the discontent for the lack of resource management produced in the region is the cause of the emergence of autonomous movements, which reflect disapproval of resource abatement (often masked with other motivations): a problem that is worsening in times of economic crisis. The possible solution put forward by the European Commissioner is a very smart insight, if implemented by Brussels. In essence, where national governments can not intervene, a space for maneuver for the European institution should be opened through investments and projects in less developed areas capable of creating economic growth that would enable the national economy to mitigate withdrawals from regions richer. The political value of this action appears to be very important: without affecting the state budgets, European action would have the function of normalizing relations between the regions and the state and between the regions themselves, in addition to becoming a direct intervention of Brussels in the territory, even if in agreement with the authority of the Member State. It would be, therefore, a tangible action of the Union and would help Brussels gain the trust of citizens; Indeed, this could indirectly address the richer regions, which would see a decline in tax revenue, and in a direct way the regions covered by European projects. This will be all the more true if the contributions of the Union will allow stable and lasting growth in the poorest regions, in order to stop unemployment and increase the incomes of their inhabitants. The hope that Pierre Moscovici's intention is expressed in concrete acts, even by surpassing the rigid budgetary logic that Europe has imposed on member states and which have been the cause of greater distrust towards Brussels.