The current scenario of the Syrian conflict

The bloodiest aspect of the Assad regime is back in the open with the bombing in the neighborhood near Damascus, which is still guarded by the Syrian democratic forces. Assad's strategy moves on well-defined and proven plans in the seven-year war. As soon as the focus shifted to the Turkish intervention with the Syrian Kurds, the dictator took advantage of the attention on Erdogan, to regain positions on the ground, especially the area closest to the capital, which had not yet returned under his control. The military scheme applied is the repetition of particularly bloody and not very targeted bombings, which indiscriminately strike fighters and civilians, including more than four hundred dead, and destroy all the infrastructures, to create the conditions for an entry of the ground forces, with a task more than facilitated by the indiscriminate use of air power. The analogies with what happened in Aleppo are clear and can only prove that Assad should be indicted for crimes against humanity. However, the international reactions are different, especially in the attitude about the need for a truce as proposed to the United Nations from Sweden and Kuwait: this abstention of fighting should have a duration of about thirty days to allow access in the bombed area of ​​humanitarian convoys , food and doctors. The proposal, supported by the USA, has been rejected by Russia, which fears that this period of time will favor the intentions of some Western governments, which aim at the fall of Assad. This event seems remote because Assad has reconquered the strategic areas of the country, however along with humanitarian convoys, Moscow fears the entry of weapons capable of threatening Damascus closely, a possibility that would put under threat continues the structure of Syria preferred by Russia and Iran. What, however, appears is a Russia that seems trapped in the role it has given itself as Savior of Assad. Moscow does not seem able to get out of a situation that had brought undoubted advantages, both internationally, where the Kremlin had returned to play a major role, both in the balance of the Middle Eastern chessboard, preserving Syria, and its strategic position under Russian influence. Assad, cleverly has been able to exploit the Russian ambitions to his advantage and this has allowed him to overthrow the course of the conflict and remain in power against all odds. Russia is still on the eve of the elections and a military role abroad held for so long is not well seen by the electorate; on the other hand, Moscow can not abandon the Syrian game and lose its accumulated prestige, even if it is not very productive to defend a dictator who is the author of brutality. In Moscow's help there is the American attitude, always too cautious with Assad and the Turkish one, which makes it possible to justify staying with Damascus. Assad, at this moment moves on two fronts: the Ghuta district, to eradicate the rebels closest to him and thus avert the possible American rapprochement and exacerbate the confrontation with Turkey, to provoke an internal disagreement with the Atlantic Alliance . The Syrian move assumes the value of a gamble because it could bring Ankara closer to Washington, but this is a calculated risk because it also obliges Russia to continue its support to Assad and strengthens the Syrian alliance with Tehran in anti-Sunnite function. Certainly there are also other unknown factors to consider: the Iranian presence and the strengthening of Hezbollah risks triggering an Israeli reaction to which Damascus is not interested, but that for the Iranians could be part of the provocation plan towards Tel Aviv. Also not to be overlooked is the possible involvement of the Saudis, who have certainly not exhausted their interests for the overthrow of the Damascus regime. The future scenario is once again very uncertain because of Assad's willingness to keep power, of Russia and Iran, to have focused on an unpresentable character to pursue his own interests, the uncertain politics of the United States and for the usual uselessness of the United Nations. The concrete danger of an enlargement of the Syrian conflict thus becomes very probable for a sum of divergent interests of foreign nations, which, at the moment, have the sole result of strengthening Assad in power with modalities and behaviors that should cause strong suspicions among his allies .