Italy: the bad management of the political crisis

The Italian story presents a very relevant anomaly both for the internal situation of the country, and for the allied countries, and for the European Union. Italy has arrived at this state of affairs for a political situation strongly divided because of policies and relations between the very contradictory parties, which led to the construction of a completely wrong electoral law, a sum of the defects of proportional and majority, built to encourage the aggregation of seemingly conflicting forces. However, the electoral outcome has subverted this understanding by regulating the chaos of uncertainty to the country. To say that the current electoral law is the only responsible cause of the current state of affairs is false, but it is certainly true that the vote counting tool was built irresponsibly and contributed decisively to this institutional crisis. Of course, first of all there is the low level of the Italian political class, which is not capable, whatever the political and party orientation, to express a competent and not improvised leadership class. The horizon of this political class is always the very short period, understood as a period of time where to draw the greatest personal advantages. Having said that, as a general premise, the management of the President of the Republic appeared to be vitiated by errors of political opportunity, which could lead to the institutional confrontation. According to the law in force the coalition that would have reached at least 40% of the votes, with a majority prize, had to be rewarded; no coalition, or single party, has reached this threshold, but the fact remains that the center-right team is the one that has come closer, resulting in the moral winner of the competition. Certainly the seats in the two branches of the parliament do not ensure the majority, but the first task to form the government was due to this coalition, even if the construction of an executive would not have been achieved. This was the first mistake made by the Italian president, who preferred to look for more shared solutions from the political forces, but thus created a prestige for the center-right forces. It must be specified that the formulation of the government was, immediately, conditioned by the vetoes of the parties, which were not available to form coalitions in the general interest able to reach the majority. The stubborn closure of what is called the left has contributed in an important way to the current scenario. Left defeated by a previous government policy that provided the exclusive perception of a right-wing action, characterized by measures against the protection of labor, in favor of precariousness and oriented towards the support of bank institutions managed in a patronage manner. The only solution that has been proposed for the creation of a government was the alliance between the populist and anti-star system of the "Five Stars" and the anti-European formation "Lega Nord", which had supported the extreme right in the French elections. Despite having different objectives and objectives, the two parties have managed to build a sort of program called "contract" where the most important programmatic points of the two camps have been included, such as flat tax, citizenship income and pension reform; however, the financial coverage of these measures has never been clear (within a country with one of the highest public debts) and this has contributed to the failure of the government's formation, otherwise imputed to the refusal to appoint a minister opposed to the currency unique European. Here the Italian president made the second mistake by preventing the formation of the executive, providing the perception of acting on the suggestion of Europe and providing the alibi of not allowing the government to change without having put the two poltical forces to the test of facts . What remains is a scenario destined for elections where the possibility that "Lega Nord" and "Movimento Cinque Stelle" are able to reach an absolute majority without any possibility of contrast, not even institutional. The post-election management has produced a highly polarized situation of difficult resolution, where Europe has its faults due to the interference carried out, but the most important institutions have acted in a rigid way, without an objective of, at least, medium-term and they are perched in positions of defense that are incomprehensible to most of the electoral body. The future is even more difficult.