The European Union gives an ultimatum to the United Kingdom

The deadline of 29 March 2019, agreed about two years before, after the outcome of the referendum on the United Kingdom's exit from the Union, could change if the new agreement between Brussels and London is reached. Beyond the assessment of the failure of the British government, unable to find a way out of Brussels in such a long time, the granting of the members of the European Council shows that in Brussels, beyond an infinite patience, there are all the best predispositions towards London; the reasons also include the desire to remove any possible excuse for the British government for the consequences that may occur. It should be remembered that the United Kingdom's output will cost the entire Union about billions of euros, but the price for England alone will be around fifty-seven million euros. If both sides have so much to lose it is easy to see who will make the deal worse. Brussels has provided two options in London: if the agreement already agreed between the parties, but rejected by the English parliament, should be approved, the release date would be May 22; with this option the United Kingdom would remain tied, in some way, to the Union, an option to which the supporters of the exit at any cost are opposed, which recognize, however, a loss of sovereignty or, better, the impossibility of returning to an absolute sovereignty of the United Kingdom on its territory. The second option, envisaged in the event of further refusal of the agreement by the English parliament, concerns the date of 12 April, as the last possible day for the convocation of the European elections. In this case, four possibilities would open up for the United Kingdom: accepting the agreement (which is almost impossible after all the rubbish), leaving the Union without agreement (hard Brexit), requesting a new postponement (it is unlikely that the European Council will show any other availability ) and finally renounce the exit from the Union. Moreover, with a longer extension, in theory, the United Kingdom should participate in the European elections and this would be an implicit, but public, defeat of the exit from Europe. Among the twenty-seven members of the European Council, there does not seem to be optimism for reaching the agreement, the talks with the British did not provide guarantees and the London government seemed to be in complete uncertainty; this perception has provoked irritated reactions in some representatives of the European Council, who considered the English executive unreliable and extended a substantial waste of time. The fact remains that the time has almost run out and that the tactical questions of the individual parties or, worse, of the individual factions within the parties, which have held both the English country and the Union hostage, can no longer continue. On the international image side, the United Kingdom is discredited for not having been able to solve a vital issue, which also involved other countries; it must be remembered that London had more advantageous conditions than the other members, precisely in view of the importance that was attributed to its participation in the Union. The reality is that the United Kingdom has always taken advantage of its status within Brussels, taking the advantages and considering them as due, but the real convictions about the Union have always been based on skepticism. The way out of the Union has confirmed this ambiguous attitude: on the one hand the tough and pure, the advocates of the need to regain the sovereignty lost, on the other who fears the repercussions that the detachment from Brussels will be able to generate. In all this, what was missing was the consideration for the 48% who had voted to stay in Europe, preferring a solution derived from a referendum that was consultative and not binding, but which was transformed at a political level into a kind of law mandatory. Not even the lightness with which it was decided was considered, nor the necessary explanations to the population, which were omitted on purpose, both by the organizers of the referendum question and by the government itself then in office. The most logical way would have been a repetition of the referendum, this time in a non-consultative way, with complete information of the electorate. In any case, this story remains a great lesson for Brussels and poses serious reflections on the functioning of the political system of the country which is considered the cradle of democracy.