The danger of the return of the Islamic State

The war against the Islamic State, although apparently won, has not completely annihilated the phenomenon of Sunni fundamentalism due to the continuing causes that had favored its expansion. There is an area on the border between Syria and Iraq, in the valley of the Euphrates river, where the negative conditions in which the local Arab populations live, would be favoring the reorganization of the caliphate's forces. The area is also rich in deposits and energy resources, which cause the presence of large contingents of foreign troops. The military forces that control the Syrian side, are Russian and Syrian troops loyal to Assad, while in the Iraqi territory there is the presence of US, Kurdish and Iranian troops. The modes of occupation of the territory are similar on both sides of the border: military operations are frequent and repressive, also due to the resumption of terrorist attacks, and arrests are often made conducted in an arbitrary manner by the male population present in the areas of operations. These modes of occupation of the territory have generated strong hostility towards the armed presence, which is in any case considered foreign, which is shifting the sympathies, in an almost obligatory manner, towards the propaganda of the Islamic State. It must be remembered that one of the causes of the rapid expansion of the caliphate in the region was precisely the Shiite intrusiveness, also on the political level, as well as in the religious one, in territories it has a Sunni majority; now that error seems to repeat itself, aggravated by the foreign military presence, which maintains a punitive approach against the local populations, to which the most basic subsistence services, such as drinking water in the necessary quantities, are not supplied, the supply of energy electricity and medicines. The Islamic State exploits this discontent by operating from rural areas, where recruitment is starting to be a success that is a sign of concern, while in cities and urban agglomerations a strategy of terror based on attacks and retaliation against those who are identified as a collaborator of the occupation forces. Once the military phase ended, with the caliphate defeated, the winning forces had to undertake a pacification with the present populations, even if these, had supported the action of the caliphate; this action should have been focused on improving the quality standards of people's lives, proven by years of war, by building infrastructures to ensure primary services. The situation that occurred, on the contrary, was marked by a too long phase of repression, favored by a lack of mutual distrust between the military forces present, to which must be added the reasons of strong contrast and aversion deriving from the fact to be on opposite fields. The absence of a concrete project following the end of the fighting has favored a sort of power vacuum, which has manifested itself precisely with the inability to provide local populations with practical tools that generate confidence in the institutions that replaced the caliphate. The presence in the local social fabric of the tribal aspect, as the main factor of social control does not seem to have been fully understood and this lack has resulted in the lack of a dialogue with local communities, which have found an absence of central power , both Syrian and Iraqi. We must remember the importance of the religious aspect in a territory where the Sunnis are the majority and are wary of alternative beliefs, especially if represented by the Shiites. In this context, where the aversion to the established power must always be kept in mind, foreign occupation was perceived as a further aggravating factor against the self-determination of the local tribes, which created an environment favorable to the resumption of consensus towards the Islamic State. The danger of a return of the caliphate to the regional scene must be carefully monitored and absolutely not underestimated, also because the Arab states, which have already funded the anti-Shiite caliphate in the past, could be tempted to repeat the operation to limit Iranian action or against Kurdish ambitions. It is a weapon that has already escaped the control of its users once and the current conditions of instability could be favorable for a repetition, with all the international consequences of the case.