The new revolts repetition of the Arab springs?

The demonstrations against the governments that are taking place in the Middle East and North Africa may suggest a sort of re-edition of the Arab springs. What distinguished the revolts that began in 2011 was a difficult economic situation, combined with the desire to demonstrate against undemocratic regimes; especially this second factor led, especially in Western democracies, but not only, to believe that the ruling classes were ready for these forms of state, ruling classes produced by all the social strata present in the countries involved in the protests. This was not the case: what followed the Arab springs did not stabilize the economies, which remained in the same difficulty, but, above all, did not create the conditions for a transition to states where democracy became the shared instrument for the management of state power . Of the democratic rites it has only survived and only in a first phase, the electoral passage, often disregarded or that has destined to the power anti-democratic forces, that have provoked shots, state, even military. Except for the Tunisian case, all the Arab springs failed to meet Western expectations and did not create the conditions for an improvement in the lives of the populations involved. The current revolts seem to arise for the same reasons as those of eight years before: a serious condition of the economy, high corruption and profoundly anti-liberal methods of government. The groups participating in these demonstrations are characterized by a lower classical political commitment, understood as participation or belonging to party forms, but are apolitical and characterized by forms of populism conditioned by religious elements, therefore influenced by the Islamic religion, most often of matrix Sunni. The religious factor was fundamental in 2011, because in societies crossed by protests, often any form of association was forbidden and religious groups, even outside the law, had filled this social void with a direct commitment, especially towards the most disadvantaged welfare states. Even now the importance of religion remains the most important aspect, but it must be understood as a flow of thought with the greatest specific weight, with respect to possible, when there are political parties, also less and less important in favor of movements, as often happens also in Europe. However, the sensitivity of Middle Eastern and North African populations to democracy was not favored, nor by a long historical process, nor was it able to grow in these few years due to massive repression. These revolts are viewed with detachment from Western countries, which seek to exploit contingent situations to their advantage, rather than offer support, because they recall the harmful effects of their interventions of previous years (see the Libyan example). We must also recognize that, although it is of a different type, populism has already demonstrated considerable capacity for advancement in Western democracies, bringing instability and less certainty of the democratic process to places where these practices were by now established. This factor, added to the disappointment of the expectations of eleven years ago, has generated a detachment that has created a cultural and political void in the countries where the demonstrations are more frequent. This absence can be filled not only by the Islamic religion, but also by external agents where democracy is absent and have great financial resources. It is a certainty that China and Russia will maintain relations with both dictators and insurgents, thanks to greater political adaptability with certainly not democratic regimes. If this is taken for granted in relations with non-democratic governments, this capacity is often exercised also with the protagonist movements of the revolts, or part of them, thanks to the great flexibility that allows the fact of being non-democratic regimes. Certainly this is done in a way that is functional to one's interests and almost always thinking about economic returns. This, however, poses a great dilemma for the West: if the US has inaugurated a withdrawal policy within its own borders, Europe has not shown itself ready to replace them, taken by surprise by Trump's unexpected arrival. For China and Russia, but also for Iran or Turkey, it will succeed in influencing the less stable countries it seems much easier than in the past and this can only mean a distancing of the enlargement of the democratic ideal, increasingly confined to the fence of the rich countries.