What future for the Atlantic Alliance?

The declarations of the French president on the Atlantic Alliance have highlighted a discomfort that goes beyond the territory of Paris on the American behavior, very variable, towards the strategies of the Alliance and their functionality. The arrival of Trump has brought about a new American vision of Europe, understood as a global power not functional to American interests. It is not a mystery that the American president has practiced a divisive tactic within the states of the Union to favor a fragmentation in order to deal with individual states, to obtain a more advantageous relationship of power for Washington, compared to the common force that the whole Union can put in place. The interest of the US president is principal
economically, but this reveals a weakness of vision both in the short and the long term, because it leaves out the importance of the European ally, as a whole, both as a diplomatic ally and as a military ally. From this last point of view the report is cracked by the accusation, not without obvious reasons, of the European flattening on the preponderant contribution provided by the Americans in the overall Atlantic defense system. The US considerations clearly speak of European financial contributions not considered by the United States, but if this could be judged correct in an alliance framework with coinciding aims, Trump's policy can now offer reasonable justifications for little contributions convinced. Failure to comply with the Iranian nuclear agreement, the flattening of the alliance with Saudi Arabia, a country deemed unreliable due to its behavior regarding the Islamic State, the too permissive policy granted to Israel on the expansion of settlements in the Palestinian territories , the tolerance left to Turkish behavior, the abandonment of Kurdish fighters and the aforementioned attempts to divide the Union, have made the United States an increasingly unreliable partner, which has made it necessary to accelerate the direction towards European military autonomy, among other things, a new topic of confrontation with the White House. Considering all these reasons, the declarations coming from the Elysée assume a different value, because they are framed by concrete negative factors that feed a sense of uneasiness that is difficult to agree with. The question whether the Atlantic Alliance still makes sense takes on a concrete meaning, which goes beyond mere provocation. Also because from the normative and organizational point of view the Alliance appears immobile in the face of the most serious recent case: the American behavior in abandoning the Kurdish allies, fundamental for the action against the caliphate, considered of fundamental strategic importance for the protection itself Europe. Hand in hand the too much freedom left to the Turks, who have repeatedly blackmailed Europe, and who have also proved to be unreliable allies for the equivocal relations held with the Sunni Islamic militias and with those of the caliphate. There is also a non secondary issue which is represented by the authoritarian turn taken by Ankara and which constitutes a further element of doubt on the real advantage of having the Turkish country among the members of the Atlantic Alliance. The French president rightly wonders about article five of the Atlantic treaty, which forces alliance members to intervene in defense of the attack that is being attacked; but can those that the Turks consider attacks by the Kurds be part of the treaty casuistry? Beyond these considerations, this is evident is that in a military alliance delegitimized by the majority shareholder, the European Union cannot face the challenges that the new scenarios impose: the increase of China's power and the Russian claims to recite again a role of great power and the same American attitude, require a new and different degree of autonomy of Europe, capable of becoming self-sufficient in terms of defense, through a different military approach and that of international politics, with a more incisive diplomatic action . All these considerations lead to questioning legitimately about the fate of the Atlantic Alliance and its role as a supplier to the new challenges, even if it will be necessary to wait for the direction to take based on the next US presidential elections: if the tenant of the White House will be the even, perhaps, a European dissociation will be desirable, although always in a framework of alliance with the United States, although interpreted differently it is certainly more autonomous. The challenge, necessary, will be to reach this capacity in a relatively short time.