The reasons that hinder the solution of the Iranian nuclear issue

Despite official statements have repeatedly said to be close to a solution of the nuclear issue, the long wait conclusion continues to be delayed. By now we are well beyond the end date, which had been set for June 30, despite this feeling of power get to the definition of the issue, alternates with the fear of not succeeding and frustrate diplomatic efforts enormous. Precisely for this reason, the negotiators of the two sides do not give up looking for the final solution. However, the US position is that they do not want to continue indefinitely the deal, the White House is determined to get out of the negotiations with a conclusive result, either positive or negative. In fact, this stretch of the negotiations does not bode well for the long-awaited conclusion, when you get down to it the two parts are new obstacles for the final signing. Yet the opportunity is too important to let it escape, a definitive agreement would put an end to years of rivalry and could allow Iran to emerge from isolation and give a new structure, perhaps more stable to the Middle East region. The discussion now revolves around three themes, which Tehran considers essential. The first issue concerns the international embargo on arms supplies, the second inspection at military sites, accepted only in reduced form by the Iranians and the third rules that will regulate the research and development that Iran can do on its territory in the nuclear field. It is, of course, three key points, which the American negotiators and French are very sensitive, probably because they fear further alter the attitude of Israel and Saudi Arabia, already deeply opposed to any kind of agreement with Iran. Of the three disputed points the first is that in the short term more agitated opponents of the agreement; the UN embargo on conventional weapons and ballistic missile technology. While maintaining the ban it is not intended to increase the power of the Iranian army in order to limit the willingness of the country to play a greater role in the regional chessboard. Although the contribution of Iran against the Islamic state, it suits the US, the gap between the two countries are still considerable and the rearmament of Iran is not viewed favorably by Tel Aviv, Riyadh and by the United States itself, where the Republican Party has repeatedly stated his opposition to the signing of the agreement. Moreover the development of ballistic missile technology could allow a future in the transport of a nuclear warhead. This is the one most feared by Israel: If, when Iran seems to be less belligerent should be noted that large parts of the society of the country continue to see the Israeli nation as the enemy to hit. The second point of contrast can hardly be acceptable to Tehran, because it may allow you to violate the confidentiality of its weaponry and represent a kind of violation of sovereignty. On this subject you could reach an agreement fixing inspections only for certain sites to be carried out in a manner rigidly agreed. The third point is the one that involves the long run because it would constantly monitor the progress and development mode is that Iran will achieve nuclear technology. Again, this puts under protection the Iranian state and, if on the one hand, they can understand the need, on the other hand offers topics of strong criticism of Iran's internal critics of the agreement. One of the major factors complicating the conclusion of the negotiations is given by their own internal public opinion: the US knows there is the opposition of Republicans, Iran is one of the movements most linked religious ideology; Both these sides have similar attitudes and think of conceding too much to the other side. But the failure to agree to a greater harm Iran, which is bound to achieve the lifting of sanctions, a measure long awaited by the population. If the Iranian government does not reach this goal, which was in the electoral program, it may have a strong internal tensions that can alter the balance of the country. For Obama it would be a defeat more personal, a stated goal of its foreign policy agenda, but that would not affect internal to the nation. Become more problematic, however, the management of diplomacy at a delicate stage of the Middle East situation. For these reasons, you can have a weak optimism on the conclusion of the works, which are, however, still in deeper uncertainty.