The implications of probable US intervention in Syria

After the proclamations against Assad, for the chemical bombardment of civilians, Trump seems to have assumed a more reflective attitude about the times and the ways of retaliation against Syria. If it is true that a naval unit travels to the Syrian coast, it is equally true that the US administration is seeking coordination with allied countries willing to support Washington. To make an effective action the timing and speed of execution are the main factors for success, but the American president seems to take time threatening a harsh response, which, however, does not come. The allies, while supporting the US in words, are tied to national assessments, as France is doing or awaiting parliamentary provisions, such as Great Britain. Outside of Europe, Saudi Arabia, which had said it was willing to participate in an action against Syria, arrived at the time to move, seems to have become more hesitant. On the other hand, the American public opinion and, above all, the one that usually supports Trump, seems opposed to engaging the American armed forces in a clash that announces risky and that could also become certainly not short. From a technical point of view it must be considered that Syria now has very effective anti-missile weapons, because it is supplied directly by Russia. Then there is the part of public opinion that opposes the American president, who believes that the action against Syria serves to divert attention from the problems that Trump has with justice. All these considerations are certainly true, but it might be equally probable that Trump awaits, before taking action against Assad, the absolute security of the actual responsibility of the Damascus regime for using chemical weapons. Also because the American president perceives a clear decrease in American prestige in the international field and, as far as Syria is concerned, he believes that the responsibility of the decrease in the US political weight was due to the attitude of Obama, who refused to punish Assad for the use of chemical weapons; on that occasion the Syrian dictator was allowed to go beyond the limits imposed by the White House without taking any sanctions, which probably would have changed the course of the story, without starting the long period of war and also the development of a substantial part of the State Islamic. On the international level, then, having allowed Assad to remain in power has given Russia back a leading role on the world theater: a role that Moscow had lost for a long time. For these reasons Trump does not want to run the risk of being compared to his predecessor for how he managed the Syrian affair. In addition, the attitude of Israel that has changed towards Damascus should also be considered: if before Assad could guarantee a certain stability to the region, the presence on the Syrian territory of Russians and Iranians is, without a doubt, a factor that has already altered the relationships of force and provoked very dangerous conflict episodes. That said, even if Trump's retaliation, as is very likely, it is not credible that the Syrian regime may be close to the end; for the US it is important to return to play the role of the past, as a nation capable of exercising the figure of the world gendarme, able to punish those who transgress to precise rules, such as the use of chemical weapons, also in projection of the reports that they want to establish with North Korea. It will be important to check how the Russian reaction can be, with implications that could go from the equilibrium of the Middle Eastern region, to the relationship between the two states, both from a political and commercial point of view (let's think about the sanctions still present against Moscow), until to get to the Pyongyang nuclear issue. At this moment Syria is at the center of the world and not just for its war.